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I. INTRODUCTION' 
A. BEING ATTACKED BY PRO-GAMBLING INTERESTS: THE BADGE OF 
CREDIBILITY? 
The research environment for academics and goverruncnt officials 
investigating gambling issues mised First Amendment concerns during the 
1990s as pro-gambling interests used substantial financial assets and other 
methods to influence the direction of the research. By 1999, Professor Kay 
C. James, the academic who chaired the U.S. National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission (NOISC), complained of gambling proponents ' 
intimidation tactics. Maintaining her objectivity, she waited until the 
NO ISC's work was completed in 1999 before publicly voicing her 
concerns. In a speech, Dr. James complained that: 
she was not prepared for the ve nom, bigotry, prejudice and 
stereotyping she experienced [from pro-gambling interests] in 
leading the Congressional study commission on the social and 
economic impact of gambling in America, 
She sa id that she had endured more bigotry and intolerance as a 
religious conservative leading the Congressional study on 
gambling than she had as 
• CofTespondcnce to: Uni"cf,ily of lIJinois, Champaign, IL 61820, US<\ Tel' + I 217 333-
6018, Professor, Univ. Ill" A.B., William and Mary, 1972; lD. 1976, MBA 1977, Univ. Ga .. LLM. 
1978, SJD 1981, Univ, Va Sorah Kim and Su,an Ksiazek providL-d valuable ass istance in updating, 
cuc-cllccking and cdltlllg this ana lysis. Thc autllor'editors attempted to delete references an<.l source 
materials too heavi ly influenced by pro-gambling ink""ts or otller slX'eiaJ intcre,t;; unless idcntifie<.l as 
such, For an analysis of publlc concerns in Ihe,e issue areas, see John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted 
Gamblers: Should Ihe Sioies Iniliale \fega-w"srlits Similar IlJ Ih" Tobacco uues?, 22 MANAGERIAL 
& DECISION ECON 17,19-21,27-28.31-32(2001) 
. Numbers In this article may easlly be adjusted to current dollars by visiting the "Consumer Price 
Index (All Urban Consumers)" of the Us. Bur""u of Labor StatiStiC' at http://slals.bls,gov/ and 
utilizing 1m, followi ng fornlula example' 
Example: S Fonner Year X rCPI Current YeariCPI Former Year]- S Current Year 
S4,OOO.000 (1983) X [184.5 (2003)/ <;9,6 (1983)] .. $7.409.639 (2003) 
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a black woman in corporate Ameri ca.\ 
Apparently, Chair James was not the only commissioner with these 
concerns. One of the nine National Commissioners, who was critical or 
pro-gambling interests, felt it necessary to travel wit h Cldd itional security 
personnel while serving on the Commission.2 
In 1999, the U.S. Gambling Commission concluded its work and 
produced two widely dis~cminatcd publications. the COlllmission's Final 
Report) and an Executive Summary.4 
Protection of FiThI Amendment academic debate is essential in every 
area, and concerns involving conflicts of interest must be addressed. With 
regard to gambling issues, the academic communi ty shou ld he morc 
sensitized to distancing itsclf from the fi nancial aura, potcnt ial intimidat ion, 
and conflicts of interest posed by pro-gambling interests or other special 
interests. As background industry data becomes incrcasingly important to 
potential future mega- lawsuits, the legal discovery proccss will necessari ly 
"follow the money"S to determi ne validity and imreachment issues - as 
recommended by the Columbia Journalism Review. 
B. THE S INE QUA NON or GAMBLING ISSUES RESEARCH: THE ACADEMIC 
REQUIREMEl\iTO AVOrD EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF CONFLtCfS 
OF i!\'TEREST 
A group consisting of Cluistiansen/Cumming::. Associates, the Lewin 
Grou p, Gemini Research (Rachel Volberg), and the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago (Christiansen 
Associates-NO RC Group) have raised issues invo lving gambling industry 
hostility toward academic research .7 When a party perfonns research that 
can be distinguished within the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group, thi s 
analysis references thc party sepamtely, such as " the NORC." One of the 
basic tenets of this analysis is that the NORC and similar academic groups 
should distance and even divorce their efforts from groups with direct 
I Assoc. Press, Jackson, \1ISS, Sept. 26. 1999 (stOI)' on Ann. \ftg. of Nan CoalitIon Against 
Legalized Gambling). 
1 For example, Commi~ione r James l)()bson, Ph.D., was accompanied by s.:~urity-oncnt~'U 
personnel nt the October 26, 1995 Ch lcn"o, l1lillOi~ meeting of the Rese.1rch Subcommittee of the 
1996-1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission. &e (ll~'() Jolm W. Kindt The Fill/lin! 10 
R<'lJldalr.: Ihe Gomb/'''IJ Im)II,",'} Fffi'cli"el.v. 1'lCenlives !orl'erpelUal Nrm-Colllpliollce, 27 S. ILL. U. L. 
J. 221 (2003): John W. Kindt, l"en.'IISf'1i Crim.> ami Lt'lJall;:mg G'/mlllmg Operll/r<JIOS. The Impacf 011 
rhe Socio-EcolWmln of BU:;IIII!SI and (jO\~rllmem, 30 CRIM. L. IJULL. SJS (1994) [hcl1!lIlailer 
/1ICrf!iJseJ Crime and Lf'!talmniJ G"mbl;NS1 
I NAT'L GMIHUNG IMPACT S'nJLlY CO'-l'-l'I'{. rr"Al REPORT (999) [hereInafter '1G1SC Fl~Al 
REPORT] 
• NAT'L GAMBlJ'"l,:G lMPAcrSruDYCO""'N, EXECunvE SU\I\IARY (I 999). 
J See, e.g .. Stephen Simurda, When Gamblmg Comes To To,..n, t994 COLU~ JOUR.'ALISM REV 
36, 37-38 [hereinafter COlU\t JOLRI'{,\USM R~v J 
• /d. Su a/so John W. Kmdt. (jambhns \~. The Ne .... Untouchables Credibilily Concerns for 
Ac.1demia. C ri minal J1ISfice, and the U.S. Supreme Coun, Address at Ucnjamm N. Curd(Yl() La ..... 
School, Yc.lma, Univ. , N.Y, N.Y, Nov. 15-16, 1999. 
7 S<!e Christiansen Associates-NORC GfOUp'S paper in the 2003 isslie of MmlUgerlll/ and D.xi,."", 
/;.C(JIIQmics (forthcoming) 
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and/or indirect links to the financial umbrae of pro-gambling interests or 
other special interests. If they do not, the NORC and similar academic 
organizations will be forced to defend and/or justify their research in thc 
face of questions regarding the extent of influence or direction exercised by 
special financial interests. Admittedly, it can bc difficult for academic 
researchers to distance themselves from sources of information within the 
gambling industry when that information is necessary to the research basco 
This, however, is not a very common scenario because in most cases, 
pro-gambling interests refuse to supply researchers with information.s For 
example, in order to obtain background information on Native American 
gambling issues, the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission was forced to 
consider utilizing its subpoena power to prod the U.S. National Indian 
Gaming Commission (NIGC) - an organization that had been criticized 
for significant improprieties by the Wa/J Street Journal. Such subpoena 
requests were determined to be ineffectual and were not utilized, but the 
fac t that the commission was forced to consider using them demonstrates 
the reluctance of pro-gambling lIlterests to cooperate with academics by 
surrendering information.9 Another example of this reluctance can be seen 
in the behavior of a Native American woup that refused to participate in a 
research survey of Wisconsin casinos "unless it was allowed to control 
the study and know the results in advance,,'1 (a condition refused by the 
researc hers ).12 
Paradoxically, the pro-gambling interests first created the issues at bar, 
and arguably, the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group allowed those 
issues to become more important than necessary by criticizing objective 
academic research and the defenders of such research who are without 
financial tics to special interests. 13 Whether or not it was intended, the 
Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's criticisms increased the net public 
relations benefit of pro-gambling interests by highlighting those interests . 
I WILUA\l THO\lPSON ET AL. THE ECONO\lIC IM PACT OF NATIVE AMERlCA~ GAMING I" 
W1SCONSI'l preface (Wis. Pol'y Res. Ins!. 1995) [hereinafter WIS. Pm'y RES. INST]; NGISC FI\' ,\L 
REPORT, supra note 3. al 7.9 (noting that the U,S. National Indian Gaming Commis,ion regulating 
tribal gambling. lh~ National lnd'all Gaming Associahon lobbying For Ihe tribes. and most tribes 
engaging m g!lJTlbling collechvely refused 10 provide the NGlSC with even basic infonnation) . 
• Tony Batt, Gambling pane/fi,mrs tlew casino morulor;lIIl1. LAS VEGAS RI:v,-J .. Apr. 29, 1999 
See also Bruce OewalJ, Regulalion afTribal Casjllos Is /'4ild. WALL ST. J .. July 22. 19%. at A9. The 
1999 U.S. Nanona! Gambling Impact Study Commission in an 8-1 VOle '1hreatened to invoh its 
subpoena powers for the fir,t time to obtain Indian gaming finan~'C records~ from the U.s. National 
Indian Gaming Commi,sion. Federal Gaming Commission Uams to Su Records, GA \UNG MAG.. 
Feb, 13, 1999, at I. 
'u WIS. POL'y RES, lNST., .wpm note S, at preface, 
]] id. 
'IIJ Set' also John W. Kindt, WoulJ R('-Criminalj~il1g u.s. Gambling Pump·Prime the Ecmromy 
and Could u.s. Gambling Facilities Be Tramformed imo Educmional and III"h-Tec}, Focililles? mil 
Ihe Legal Disco"ery of GlIIllhling Companies' SffrelS Confirm Re~,.arch issues:'. 8 STAl"FOItD J.L, 
BuS, & fl:o.:. 169, 172-76 (2003) [herclllalkr Gambling Facilities Tram formed into Educmional 
Facilitjes]. 
" See:. e_g. supra nole 7; Christiansen Assoc.-NORC 1999 Overview Survey. infra nOle 14. al 
17·]8 (abandoning the traditIOnal measunng screen. the South Oaks Gambling Screen _ as reportedly 
directed by the research mandate - but providing nO dm .. comparisons to it), 
4 Somhenl Califorma Illlerdisciplinary Lull' JOllrnal [VoL 13:1 
Academics should be of Olle accord in conducting their research to the 
hi ghest standards within their respective discipli nes. In the area of 
gamb ling issues, th is requires a complete divestment from the direct and 
indirect financial and research influences of pro-gamb li ng interests and 
other special interests to eliminate the possibility of even lhe appearance of 
such conflicts of interest. 
C. Sr'EClALlZED CONCERNS WITHIN THE RESEARCI I ENVIRON\1Et\ T 
Part of the research for the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission was 
under the direction of Chri stiansen/Cummings Assoc iates, the Lewin 
Group, Gemini Research, and the NORC (basically, the Christiansen 
Assoc iates-NORC Group).14 In 2002, the Christ iansen Associates· NORC 
Group took issue with two paragraphs in the article The Costs of Addicted 
Gamblers: Should Ihe Sllltes Initiale Mega·Lawsuirs Similar 10 the 
Tobacco Cases?IS (hereinafter Mega·Lawsllits) , apparently objecting to the 
following critique: 
One interesting scenario involves the NO RC, which performed the 
cost estimates for the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission.16 The NORC estimated very few of the types of 
applicable costs and entirely omitted some types of costs. 
Consequen tly, these estimates were notoriously low and, therefore, 
lacked credibility." The methodology ulili7ed by NO RC in 
calculating these estimates has been crit icized as beinR flawed and incomplete- particularly regarding methodology. Other 
est imates which are at the lower end of the spectrum have been 
performed by reputable groups, such as the S I 0,000 figure reported 
by the Wisconsin Policy Research Institllte,19 but it is illl~ortant to 
note that these arc on ly partial listings of the total costs. 0 Public 
relations ex perts for the gambling industry lend to seize on these 
,. Nat'l OpmlOn Res. Center et al . Gambling Impact and Behavior Study: Rcpon 10 the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission (1999) [hcreinalkr Chn~tiansoelll'l~soc.-NORC 1999 Study]; Naf l 
OpmlOn Res. Center el al.. Overview of National Survey and Communuy Database Rcscan:h on 
Gambling Behavior, Report to the Nallonal Gambling Imp.1CI Study Commi<;sion, r eh. I, 1<)<)9 
[hcrd nufter Christiansen ASS(lc.·NORC 1999 Overvlcw Sun'c),); Nat'l Opimon Res. Clr. et aI , Slide 
Show: National Sl.In·c)' und Community Database Research on Gamblmg. Preliminary Report to the 
National Gambling Impact Study Commisston. Feb. 16. J<:>99 (re\ cd) [hereinafter Christiansen 
Assoc.-NORC 1999 St,des Sun.ey Dmaoo'>C]. These cost issues mvolvmg pathological and problem 
gamblers will be addressed m thl~ 81l11lysn. 
,. Joh n W. Kindt. The COSIS of Addic/ed Gamblers. SJumtd Ihc 51UleS Im/wle Mega-IAl .... ·.<llil.< 
Simltar to the Tobacco Cas".;? 22 MANAGERIAL & DEC. EcoN. 17.32 (2001) [hcrcmaftcr .\ft'ga-
Law.ullt5] 
.. Compa" sourcn in footnote 14 ~upra. In panicular. $«. I' g. ChnSl1an,CTl Assoc. -KORC 1m 
Study, supra note 14 ($Ccllon~ on cost!! of gambling. wh ich have ~rsoe footnotes/referenccs). lJa.cd on 
this ",port. the "'GISe Filial Report devotes only t\\-o pal>~'S 10 the socio-economic costs aswcialcd with 
adult o,atllolol>i~al 3nd problem gambl ing. NOISC FI"AL REI'ORT, supra nOle 3. at 4- 13, 4- 14. 
I1Id 
"Id Set" "Tremls Il11d Condit ioning Factors" infra. 
,. WIS. PoL'y REs. IN5T .• Sllpril note 8. "t41-42. 
l\l ScI!. I!.g .. id 
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lower estimates without revealing to the public that they constitute 
only panial costS.21 
5 
In addition, the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group appeared to 
disagree with the following concems involv ing the estimates given in their 
1999 repon: 
The spectre of intimidated academics has also been raised as in the 
case of the NORC estimates. When the academics from NO RC 
were giving their preliminary repon to the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission, they were severely criticized by the 
gambling industry representatives sitting on the Commission. One 
commissioner representing the gambling industry even threatcned 
the academics with legal action, claiminB that their methodology and data collection methods were flawed. Skeptics noted that the 
NORC final report thereafter reported very conservative estimates 
involving both the costs of pathological gamblers and the 
prevalence of pathological gamblers in the general population. The 
NORC also changed the definitional approach to calculating the 
prcvalence of pathological gamblers but significantly. these 
changes were never incorporatcd into thc academic literature by the 
general academic community. It is common practice when 
introducing new measures or statistics to calculate the old as well 
as the proposed new oncs on the same data to provide a 
comparison or bench,mark. NORC provided no such 
campa ri sonfbe nch mark. 2, 
Thesc particular concerns can only be addressed and visualized within 
the overall context of freedom for all academic and government officials to 
conduct research in an environment unencumbered by pro-gambling 
interests or other special interests. The pro-gambling interests first raised 
and emphasized most of these issues. Therefore, those interested in the 
discovery process for infonnation, as well as academia, must necessarily 
address these issues . The Chronicle of Higher Education/4 the Los Angeles 
TImes,25 the Philadelphia Inquirer,26 and other national news media have 
cautioned not only government officials, but also the academic community 
about naively accepting information from pro-gambling interests that has 
been packaged as valid research. The test recommended by the media is to 
II Mega. l.aw.~uits, supra nOle 15, at 32 
" Da~e &ms. G(lmbling Sun-ey Appro'ro. LAS VEGAS R£\',.J .. Oct 10. 1998. at 01 [heremafter 
Gamb[lng S"n-·eyj. 
" Mega·Law.suit,. supra nOle 15, at 32, 
,. David L Whe<:kr. A SfII'ge of Research on Gllmb[mg [s Fin(lnced in Part by the Indusrry ITSelf 
CURON. IIIGIiER EDuC .• Mar. 5. 1999, al A 17 [hereinafter Re"ean::h Finallced by Industl)'], 
:J Daviol Ferrell & Malea Gold, Casino Industry Flights on Emerging Badlasn. L.A. TIMES. Dec, 
14. 1998. at A I [hercinaticr Casino 8ad;laslrj. See also MaleR Gold & DaVid Ferrell, Going For Broke. 
L.A. TIMES. Dec, \ 3, \999. at A 1 [hereinafter Going FOI' Broke] 
), Loretta Tofani. Gambling Ind"w)' ScI'1;" a Winfllng Image, Companies Bel They Can Shake Off 
Crilk~ Who Blame Ine Games for Social Problems. PHILA, INQUIRER, July 6, 1998, at A 1 [lIeT~inafter 
Gamhling Seeks (mage]. 
--------------------------------------------------------~) 
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"follow the money." as enumerated by the Columbia Journalism Review27 
in 1994. Specifically, the Columbia Journalism Review suggests that 
investigators ask if experts, academics, government officials, and even the 
news media have any direct or indirect financial links to the expansive 
resources of pro-gambling interests or other spec ial inlereS\s.:l8 
The Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's "comment"Z9 gives the 
appearance of objecting more to the two paragraphs in the Mega-Lawsuits 
anicle that defend their right to an unprejudiced research environment, than 
to the highlighted pattern of actions by pro-gambling interests. This 
impeaches the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's complaint as a non 
sequitur. The Mega-Lawsuits article should be interpreted as asserting the 
FirsT Amendment academic independence of all researchers and 
encoumging experts to divorce themselves from overt and subtle influences 
exercised by special interests, particularly pro-gambling interests. The 
Christiansen Associates-NORC Group should be lauded for asserting its 
independence from the influence of special interests .30 However, the larger 
question is why these matters are raised in the national news media and 
academic literature, and why there is a focus on alleged attempts by 
pro-gambling interests to direct, compromise, or even prejudice research 
efforts?3l 
II. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS 
A. TilE FIRST AMENDMENT RESEARCH El\'VIRONMENT: H AVE PRO-
GAMBLING INTERESTS SUBJECTED ACADEMICS TO A PATTERN OF 
INTIMIDATION? 
The complaints of intimidation tactics by pro-gambling interests, which 
were voiced by Dr. Kay James, the Chair of the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission,32 could be considered overstated if there did not exisl a 
history of similar complaints to corroborate her concerns. Particularly 
throughout the 1990s, several academics, elected representatives, and 
experts testified before U.S. Congressional committees, state legislative 
committees, and the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
regarding the reported intimidation tactics of pro-gambling interests, 
including allegations of threats against academics and/or critics of 
bI' D gam Ing. 
11 COLU~1. JOURNAUS.\t R£v .• supra note 5. at 30. 37·38. 
~ld 
N SI''' ~1'pr<l note 7 . 
• fd 
II See. "g. COLU>,.! . JOURNALISM REV .. supra note 5, at 36, 37-38: Cosino IJadl(l../r, supra note 
25. at AI. Research Financed by Indu)'lry. supra note 24. al A 17: Gambling Seeks {mag". s"pra 
note 26, at AI. See. e.g .. Gambling Surwy, .~upra note 22, at DJ (exemphfying threatened 
lawsUIt), 
31 See Iupra nOle J and accompanying tex\. 
II SC('. e_g_. i,ifra notes 44-5 1 and accompanying texi 
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In 1995, University of Massachusetts Professor Robert Goodman 
summarized some of the tactics utilized against academics in the 
introduction to his book The Luck Business,34 beginning with a letter of 
complaint from James Ritchie, the Executive Vice President of Mirage 
Resorts to the President of the University of Massachusetts. In pan, the 
letter states, "the results of this survey have been used as a weapon in 
anacking very sound economic proposals by any number of companies 
involved in gaming and entertainment projects ... Who is Robert 
Goodman and what are his credentials for undertaking such a study?,,3S 
Ironically, Mr. James Ritchie, the casino executive who wrotc this 
complaint to the President of the University of Ma~saehusetts, was a former 
administrator with the 1976 U.S. Gambling Study/; but in a subsequent in-
depth 1998 expose in the self-explanatory New York limes article, "From 
Gambling's Regulators to Casinos' Men," Mr. Ritchie declined to be 
interviewed.)i 
Goodman's The Luck Business followed his earlier 1994 report, 
Legalized Gambling As A Srraregy For Economic Development,38 a ground-
breaking report funded by the Ford Foundation and the Aspen Institute, and 
identifies and summarizes the inappropriate pressures exerted on academics 
as follows: 
My presentations typically elicited heated attacks from politicians 
and leaders of the gambling industry. Some raised questions about 
my right to do this research at a Slate univers ity, while others tried 
to cast doubt on my professional qualifications. People -
sometimes posi ng as prospective students - phoned my 
department at Hampshire College to get background information 
on me. JQ 
It almost appeared that Professor Goodman and other academics were 
being subjected to a campaign by pro-gambling intcrests to undennine their 
research and/or job positions. This notion is further corroborated in the 
following excerpt from Professor Goodman'5 book: 
Letters of complaint were written to the president of the University 
of Massachusetts, where the research was carried out, accusing me 
of maligning a productive industry. An investigation of my slUdy 
and ils finances was undertaken by a Massachusetts state senate 
oversight committee, headed by a state senator who was a lead ing 
~ RUBERT GOOU\4A"" THE LUCK BUSINESS, imrodUCliOJl (1995) [hcrcilmlicr LOCK BUS"'ESSj. 
" LUCK BUS"'ESS. supra notc 34, at mtrodlKllon. citing 10 Lcner [0 Michael K, Hooker, 
President, University of MMsachuscns, from James E. Ritchie, Exec. Vice Pre;idenl, Corp. De~ .. 
IIfira~ Re>'Ons. Las Vegas. NV. May 24. 1994 
US. CO\1M'N ON THE REV. OF A NAT' L POL'y TOWARO GA.\4DU:>;G. GAM3U:>;G rN AMERJCA 
(U,S, Gov'\. "riming Off, 1976) Ihcrcinaftcr U.S. COMM'N GM1BLlNGJ 
" Brct! Pulley. Fmm Gi1mblil/g~ /(eglllarur~ /u emUI/U)" Me". N, Y. Time~. Oct. 28. 1998. at AI. 
J' ROIll:RT GooDMAN. LEGALIZED GAM3L1;-;G As A STRA:rEGY FOR ECO:-;OMIC DEVELOI'MEtI.'T 
(Ctr. £Con. Devc!opment. U, 1I1ass.-Amherst (1994)) [hereinafter CED REI'O~Tl. 
~ LUCK BUSINESS, .\'Upm nole 34. at introduction, 
• 
8 Southern Califonrta fmerrlisclplinary Lml JOllrnal [Vol. 13:1 
proponent of gambling ex pansion . .w Un named sources caUed 
newspaper reporters to describe the Ford Foundation and the Aspen 
Institute, which funded the research, as "moral crusaders" against 
gambling. Ami in spite of the fact that I openly acknowledged thai 
I gamble myself, I was also attacked as (I" ant igambling moralist.41 
Professor Goodman postul ated the reason for these tactics as follows: 
As a result of all this. ['ve developed a fairly good understanding 
of why gambling industry execut ives and politiC ians were so 
disturbed by our work. Casinos and electronic gambling machines 
can be extremely profitable, and public debate about their 
economic and social consequences was simply seen as threatening 
those profitS.4l 
Thus, the gamblin g industry is unique in that any perceived threat to 
thc potential mega·profits of pro-gambling interests prods overreachin g 
responses, at least according to Professor Goodman. 
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RESEARCH ENVIRONME'T: HAVE PRO-
GAMBU-":G Tr-.:TERESTS SUBJ ECfED ACADEMICS AND/OR 
GOVER:-.I~1ENT OFFICIALS TO THREATS? 
Examples of alleged threats aimed at academics and government 
offic ials abound. During his 1998 sworn testimony in Chicago before the 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Iowa State Representative 
Wi lliam Witt alleged lhat his criticisms of expanded legalized gambling 
were met with "death threats.,,43 The University of Chicago component of 
the Chri st iansen Assoc iatcs·NORC Group was prox imate to and fam ili ar 
with the environment of thi s hearing and similar hearin gs before the 
National Commission. Similarly, in testimony before a U.S. Congressional 
Hearing in 1994. Professor Robert Goodman compla ined of the tact ics 
utilized by some pro-gambling interests and stated, ,'[t]o be quite honest, I 
was at first surprised by thc intensity of some of the anacks ... [by] people 
in the gambling industry.'..44 At the same Congressional Hearing, Dr. 
Valerie Lorenz test ified , "Dr. Goodman said that he has received all kinds 
.., St:l'. e,g .• Ford Tumer, Agenn Queries Casin o Crilldsm. UNION-N(wS (Spnngfield. Mas5,). 
Apr. 14, 1994, all. 16 . 
• , LUC K BUSINESS, ~uprC/ note 34. at mtroduction, Su Joon V~nl1och i , High Slalre,., BOSTON 
GLOD£. May 31. 1995, 01 39 (exemJ)li fyillg bch ind-lhc-sccncs cflbns by an employee of one caslIlo 10 
dis.:redit Whittier Law l'rofe ~sor I. l\elson Rose and linl\CNlly of Illinois Cconomics Professor Earl 
Gnnols). 
'J LLCK BUSI)o;E.~S, SUpr;I note 34. HI VI iI. See genertll(I' John W Kimlt. !nternul;onally, nre lift 
Century i.i .\'0 Ttmefor Ihe UntltV StoIcs 10!Joe GamblmJ: .. ·ilh the F.cmIOnl.l'. Taxpayers Subsidi:ing 1M 
Gambling Indusln' and ,Ire De FaCIO Elimina/ion of All Casrno 1ux Rt'I"ellul.'S '·W Ihe 2001 ECOIIomi( 
Slimulus ACI. 29 QBlO 1\. UNl\' L. REV 363 (2:003t John W Kindt & Stephen W. Joy, Internet 
Gamblillg alld the {kswmli:oli()11 o/National alld Interna/ioMI t.ctJnomie.s· Ttme/Qr a Comp",helHi,e 
8011 ml G"ambllllg o.."(r Ihe lIorilllHdt K'cb. 80 DENY. U. L. RFV. 111 (2002). 
'J Testimony of Iowa SIDle KeprL'SCnta1 ivc Wilham Will before the Nat IOnal Gambling Impact 
Study Commission. Chic.1S0, 1l1 , May 20. 1998. 
"TIlt' NativnuJ ImIX"·' v/Clmnu G(lmbJmg Pm/i(era/ioll· Flcal";ng UefOfT! Ihe House CQI1Im. on 
Smull 8mmes~, 10Jd ConG., 2d Scss., 4 (J994) (t .. stlmooy of Prof. Rober1 Goodman, Univ. Mass.) 
[heremaflcr COlIgf't'S>.ionll / GumMing {/l'"rillg 1994]. 
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of threats," and also compla ined, "so have J .' ,4~ In addition, the Washington 
Post reported that after testifying at this Congressional Hearing, States 
Attorney Jeffry Bloomberg had received a "death threat:t4(i 
Incidents involving one state commission occurred in 1995 and again 
In 1997, when the Iowa Racing and Gam ing Commission denied a casino 
license. [0 the latter instance, the Commission panel was showered with 
"angry letters:' some of which "were so threaten ing they were turned over 
to the Iowa Division or Criminal Investigation.''''? For opposing expanded 
gambling, some state agencies such as the West Virginia Attorney General's 
Office have had their budgets CUi by pro-gambling interests. tS 
Gambling companies that have financed or backed Nat ive American 
gambling have also been embarrassed by the ir pro-gambli ng associates. In 
an open letter to Michiga n leg islators, Chri s Guzaldo, the Executive 
Director of Citizens for Pokagon Casino, wrote, "I am in vesl igating which 
polit ici ans are sta ll ing Ihis approval process again and why ... [and] [i]f I 
do not receive the proper response to my letters or meetings with 
leg islation by 3-23-97, I wi!1 ask the Federal Governme nt 10 in vesligate!"4~ 
After the Chicago Sun-Times publ ished the 1998 article entit led "Mich. 
Casino Backer Tied to Mob,"sO Mr. Guzaldo faded away from his pos ition 
because of his "long arrest record ... [but indicated he was] not doing the 
mob 's business as he pushe[d] for app.roval of a casi no proposed by the 
Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Ind ians. "sl 
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RESEARCH E NVIRONMENT: HAVE PRO-
GAMBLING INTbRESTS SU BJECTED ACADEMICS ANDIOR 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO THE INTIMIDATION OF LAWSUITS? 
Attempts to 
th reatened legal 
intimidate First Amendment academic inquiries via 
action have historically generated academic and 
" Cungre1siona/ Gambling If taring 199{ 5upra IlOIe 44, al 12 (Ie.;Iimony of Dr Valene lorenz, 
Dir .. Compul~i,"c Gambling Center, Bn1tunorc. Md.). 
<I Jncx Anderson & Michael BmSlcm. Deadwood .~ Gamhlt Ha.~" ~ Paid Off, WAS H. POST, Oct. 7. 
1994 C'Washinf,'1on MeITy-Go-Round" ) ("after te<tifying before a CO"!; rcS~lQnal com.mttee "","~ral of 
Deadwood's [S Dnxola] ca,ino o,,"'lers Ihrcntc n~'<.l his lBloomb~rg'sllife"): I'at Dobbs, lJ/oombel"g Say.f 
ReJl0r/ /.II Dellrh Th",'lIr O,-erb/owll, KA~ID CITY J. (Rapid City, S.D.), OCI. 8. 19Q4. ill C 1 (citmg 10 thc 
WASHINGTON POST) . 
., William Pet roski. ,\'"", ~i>re QJ! Osu"'" eU!;nU m Hand, Drs MOINI:.S REG, Apr. 7, IQQ1. at 
MI. M6 For lhe 1995 S(cnanos mvolving Ihe Iowa Racing aoo Gaming Commission,!oee Wilham 
PClloskl. RtgUlarors.· Oppo.!ilion Oul "//.int!, DF.5 MONES R[G.. Aug. 16. 1995 (Iccording to one 
member of Ihe Iowa Racing and Gammg CommiSSIon. ~ll 1hesc altacks on OUT personal integrity are 
Un~ Ul1llnK-d and unmented."). 
<I Address by West Virgillia ,\"onley Genern l Darrell V. MacGraw, Jr .. before the Annual Conf. of 
Ihe Nat'1 Coalilioo Agamst Lcgahzed Gambling, Branson, Mo, Mar. 10, 1995 . 
... Open letter to State Represent;Jl ive~, from Chris Guzaldo. Ul"'C. Dlr, lllllCTIS for Pokagon 
CaSillO, Mar 12. 19<11 
!OJ Cum SUllPSOll, Mh-h. Cas/no ilack.er ned To Mol>, CHI. S LJ' · TI\lES. Dec 13. 1998. at .-\24 
Il /d. 
[ 
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governmental outrage.52 When First Amendment public-forum debates 
have revealed information that is unfavorable to the gambling industry, 
pro-gambling interests have arguably demonstrated a predilection toward 
threatening to file lawsuits. 53 These scenarios have occurred despite ethical 
precedents which indicate that legal interests "shall not: File a suit, assert a 
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action. [when 
they know] or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to 
harass ... ,,54 This stricture in the prcccdential Canon 7 of the American 
Bar Association's Code of ProfessionaL Responsibilirl5 influenced the 
twenty-first century ethical requirements for legal advisors. 
On October 9, \998, the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's initial 
work was reponed to the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission. During the 
report to the nine-member Commission, two of the pro-gambling 
Commissioners vociferously aired their concerns. One of them, J. Terrence 
Lanni, the chairman of the gambling company, MOM Grand Inc., went so 
far as to "threatcn[J legal action against NORC.,,56 
Lanni accused NORC of "shabby" work and unprofessional 
conduct during the pilot survey at MOM Grand and Treasure Island 
casinos in Las Vegas. He said NORC tried to intervi ew a 
uniformed MGM employee; had one employee interview two 
MOM patrons at once; and either allowed or asked one MOM 
patron to write his responses instead of interviewing him. Lanni 
was further incensed that NORC broke a promise by publicly 
identifying MGM Grand and Treasure Island as the interview sites . 
He threatened legal action against NORC.57 
Commissioner Lanni stated, "'Because of the fact that anonymity was 
not observed and what I consider to be false allegations ... thi s eompan~ 
reserves its right to seek full legal redress for these actions,' he warned" 
as chairman of MOM Grand. From the Christiansen Associates-NORC 
Group, Lanni reportedly singled-out the NORC59 and raised issues of both 
competence and integri ty.60 "Researchers [NORC] found that one-third of 
86 people questioned at the properties were considered problem gamblers, 
but Lanni questioned whether the researchers conducted the interviews 
" See generally Gamblmg Sun'ey. supra nOle 22. al 01 See (l/.so Assoc. Press, Wichita r(lcetrad 
warns crilic uj suil: TesllIIwny b.fvl"(' iegis/alil't' pand IS called siundCl"Ol"·. KAN. CiTY STAR (Topeka, 
Kan.), Apr. 17, 1997 (The racetrack quickly retracted its '·warning·' after being critlcizcd by thc press.). 
Ij /d. For an international perspective On gambling research financed by pro-gambling interest>, 
see lcnmfcr Dorrell. 10111es in gambling reswr-ch "nd implicallO"'· JOY priMe policy. Paper for 
"Dis-anning the Bandils" (onf., Victoria Univ. & Victorian Local Govcrnancc Assoc .. Sept. 12-13. 
2002. 
" AM. BAR ASSOC., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPO~SlUILJTY, Olsclphnary Rule 7-102(A)(I) 
(Aug . 12.1969) 
" Iii. 
M Joe Weinert, U.S. Gaming Panel m Sludy Gamblers ·Habil., in Casinos, S. J 8I.S~Y l'uu .. Oct. 10, 
1998 WCfcinaftcr u.s. Gamblers' Habils in Casinos] 
Iii. (emphasis adde.:l) . 
.It Gamb/ing sun:ey. s"pra note 22, at I §D 
-'" /iI.: u.s. Gamblers· Habits in Casinos. supra nOle 56. 
6(1 Gumb/ing S"rwy .. Iupra nOle 22, at 1 ~O. 
2003} The Gambling InduslIY and Academic Research I I 
without potentially biasing the results. ' My question is the competence of 
(the research center) In thi s particular instance,' Lanni said.,,61 
Lanni also specifically "criticized . .. [the] preliminary survey of 
casino customers as employing a 'very shabby approach. ",62 He further 
questioned whether the survey was conducted with "integrity and 
honesty.,>63 
"T really question the capability here. I've said before, there is a 
percentage of this population that should n't be gambling and that 
this industry should be dealing with that issue more. I wan t to get 
to the bottom of this, but we need integrity and honesty," Lanni 
said.64 
Wh ile the U.S . Gambli ng Commission voted 6 to 2 in favor of 
continuing NORC's research work, a chorus of pro-gambling interests and 
lobbyists joined Commissioners Lanni and John Wi lhelm in criticizing 
NORC's methodology and research :6$ 
The American Gaming Association [lobbying group], which 
represents half of Atlantic City 's 12 casinos, called NORC's survey 
methods "seriously flawed." "Today the commission took steps to 
continue the tradition of sloppy, third-rate research on matters 
related to gambling behavior and gambling policy in the United 
States. The American people and public policy deserve much 
better," said Dean Hestennann, manager of policy analysis and 
research for Harrah's Entertainment Inc., which owns two Atlantic 
City casinos.66 
After NORC's report was completed in 1999, further criticism was 
forthcoming from the Harvard Medical School, Division on Addictions:67 
NORC's efforts represent only one of many ways to measure the 
impact of gambling. It is entirely possible that a different 
methodology might yield wholly different results. Furthermore, 
the analysis considers only casinos. Although NORC addresses 
other forms of gambllng. casino gambling is the only type 
subjected to the present regression methodology.tiS 
Onee again, however, it should be noted that the components of the 
Harvard Med ical School, Division on Addictions, which generated th is 
.1 hi. (emphas Is added). 
6l fd 
. ) U.S. Gilmbl<:r~" f/"bil,' In CWfinos. wpril note 56 . 
.. ", 
.~ '" American Gaming Associalion Press Re lease. Sla tcmcnt by Frank Fahrcnkopf. Jr" AGA. 
"Re: Release of the Most Recent NORC Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission,~ 
Mar, 18, 1999 [hereinafter Atmrican Gaming Assoc iat ion Criliciles/Spins NORC Report ( 0 NGlSC]. 
American Gaming A,socialion Press Rekru;c , Addendum. "NORC Alters Findings of Final Report wi th 
Sensational Langl.l<lge, Data Modificaliolls and Omissions, and Unsound Analysis," MaL 18. 1999 
[hereinafte r American Gaming ASSOCiat ion Claimed NORC Alters Findmgs]. 
"" U.S. Gamblers '1Iilhi,~ ill Casino~, supra note 56 
.' ~The National Gambl ing hnJl<1CI Study Cnmmission: Part III." The Wager (Harvard MedIcal 
School. Di~lslon 011 AddiclIOIIS), Aug. 3, 1999 [hereinafter "Study Commission"]. 
'" /d, 
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criticism have themselves been criticizedb9 for accepting millions of dollars 
in (albeit appropriate) funding from pro-gambling in tcrcsts. 'o 
In a display of what could only be deemed political harassment. a few 
days after NORC's report to the U.S. Gambling Commission on October 9, 
1998, the Commission was hamessed with an audi t requested by Nevada 
Senator Richard Bryan.71 The U.S. General Accou nti ng Office (GAO) 
performed the audit, which revealed nothing improper. In fact. it confirmed 
the integrity oflhe Commission's operations. 72 
Due to the contentious nature of gambling issues. researc h into these 
areas must avoid the appearance of impropriety. The solution 10 these 
dilemmas and cnticisms is for the NORC, the Harvard Division on 
Addictions, and <111 <lcademics to divorce th emselves completely from 
groups with direct or indirect conflicts of inlere~1. pan icularly financial 
interests. If pro-gambling interests can raise such major crcdib ility issues 
with respect to thc $1.25 million government NORC study, a fortiori 
researchers must avoid any "follow the money" links to pro-gambling or 
other special interests. 
III. CLARIFICATION OF GOALS 
With respecl to research involving gambling issues. the overall goal is 
for all researchers to pursue their experti~e area unencumbered, 
uninfluenced, and unintimidated by special interests. When gambling 
issues move into the legal arena, based upon the principle of "follow the 
money," direct and indirect sources of financial support will be subjected to 
Ihe discovery process. Accordi ngl y, an appropriate goal would be for 
researchers and CXpCIlS to be sensitized to this problem and to divorce 
themselves from direct or indirect connicts or interest. 
Since 1995. rhe national news media has indicated that pro-gambli ng 
interests' financial influence may have prejudiced research into gambling 
issues.?3 In procedures invo lving the legal discovery of infonnation, the 
national news media has advised interested parties (such as attorneys, 
public welfare advocates, and governmenl officials) to inquire into the 
.. See. e.g., Ca.IIIlO Backlash. ~'Ipru Il()t~ 25. at A I. R.·!o""'·<.h 1'111""«"/ by Illdu.l/ry. supra nOlI.' 24. 
at A 17; Gambling S .. "h lmaf:~. <upra nOlI.' 26. at A I. 
'" See. e.g .. NotlOnaL Center for K~pon. i bl~ Gaming, Annual Report 2. 4-7 (2001) (funded almos! 
e~clu~i"cly by pro-gambling mtcrt'SIS). 
" Cruino Hadla,·h. "upra 0011.' 25. at A I Su Lener from Ikmard L. l>ngcr. Dlre<:tor. 
Government llusmc:ss Opcratlon. I~.u.:s. Gcncral Accounting Officer to Mr. Timothy Kelly, Executive 
DII'rCtor, National Gamblmg Impacl Study CommiSSion (Oel. 16, 1998) (on file Wl lh B.>mard L 
Unger). See also Joe \\1.';....,11. CQI'g""-l GAO to Probe U.s Gam/ow Commission. THE PRESS OF 
AlL\'TlCCtTY (5. Jersey Pub. Co.), (Xt. 20, 19%. atAI 
" Wei....,l1, sllf'm nOle 71, at A I . For analyses of the gamblmj mdu.lr)··s mtcrface .... lth l<;SUes 
m"ol\mg U.S. go\<,mmcnt poli61.'~, U.S ""military re3din-ess." and terrorism. see John W. Ktnd~ 
GumMing "ilh Terrorism and V.S .. \/ihtary Readim·ss. lim(' IQ Bun ViJL"a Gumbling De..,ses On lIS. 
Miliwry BaIes and F",.,lIIw<', 24 N IL L. U. L RFV. 1 (2003) [he~mafkr C«mblmg ,../111 1/:m.Jrl;m 
and U.S. Military Reat/inl!S!.j 
'J Set'. eg., ~UJ"'a OOltS 24-3 1 and accompanying tC"l:1. 
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extent to which the financial aunt of the gambling industry might have 
influenced various organizations, their publications, and/or their associates, 
such as: 
I. The National Council on Problem Gambling (and individual 
state councils on problem gambli ng);74 
2. .Juurnal o/Gambling S'udie~; 13 
3. National Center for Responsible Gaming:76 
4. Gaming Law ReviewH (whic h is misleading !)i ncc it has no 
uni versi ty sponsor); and 
5. The University of Nevada at Las Vegas Law SChOO] 78 and its 
publications. 
IV. HI STORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. ATIEMI'T1i\G TO STor PRO-GA \.1BUNG ]\lTERESTS FROM PR£./UDICING 
TH E RESEARCH ENVIRON:-'IENT: THE ESTABLl SIIME:'>. r OI'TIIE 
1990s NAT10~AL GA \1BLlNG LMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 
In 1998, Frank fahrenkopf. the CEO o f the Washington-based lobbying 
group American Gaming Association (A GA), complained, "[t]he 
Washington Post has editorialized 38 times in the lasl 38 monlhs against 
gambling , Thirty eigh t times,,,7'" As the watch-dog of Washington D.C.'s 
national politics, the Washingtoll Post repeatedly identified and walllcd 
Congress and the American public of the multiple problems and historical 
scandals associated with legaliLed g(lmbling aetivitiesY' 
In 1997, Washington Post editoria ls exemplified the public's distasle 
for the gambli ng industry lobbyists' efforts to "stack" the nine- member 
1999 U.S. Gambling Commission after its creation in 1996,81 In Ihe mid-
19905, pro-gambling interest involvement in Commission appointments 
.. Se.', ",g GUIiI/! for Broki'. supra IlVk25. alAI; C<llino Baclda$h. mpro nOle2S. at AI; 
Gambling S«iu Image, slIpra note 26. at A I. 
'J fd, Sf'e COLU\l JOURNAU~M RFV'~"I"" 110t~ 5, at 36·38. 
'" fd S!.'" If,'nerally i?estmrch Flnilltcea by {ndll.III)', ,lUpm l10te 24. at A17, Sec also Rick Aim. 
KC Will he I{ollle to FOllndalinnfor Ga",h//It~ S/I"he'. KA"~A5 CITY ST~R. Oct 11. 1995, al BI : 
Assoc, Press, /n<llNn' I" .')t,,,1y Problem (iamb"·,. OD; MON[S REG.. F~b. 19, 1\196. at AI Ih~rei nafl~r 
/ndu~I')' to Swdy f'1'QbIem Gambler]. 
T' fndu<ln' 10 Swdy Prohlem Gamhl..,. "'IW/' lIOfe 16. at '\ I 
11 See alsu G"mbling s.'t'.t> Imuge. ~I.pr(1 nOie 26. at A I: fIlinois Pro{e.UQf Talin S' '''''K al UVLVs 
/.tnI. School 81d, ~A)<, DIEGO UNION-TRill .. VIa} 9. 1999, Joon L Smith, Profi·, .. wr s.: .• ,~ Gmtl('r5 lind 
floolien 1I1l,} '''''''\'''.$ Oh M". LAs VEGAS REV .• J.. ~O\. 2. 1997. at 18. !iN general/I' (iamhlinK 
FUCI!tII/!$ 1run:;/ormed into EducatiOflall'udflliu. <"pro nOlC 12, at 189-90, Gambit'll: "'Ih 1i'rrnnsm 
and US Militurv Rt'adinCM. supra nOle 72. ~1 J4-36 
.. Da'e P~lermo, Capi/O{ Gllm" J",T ' L(,iAMI"G & WAC£RI"G Bus., ALlg. 19~5, al I. 5~ (the main 
tl1ldc magazine o fthc American gambling mciuwy) 
-00 S.,!, g~lI~mll> III 
., Nut!Ouul Gumbling Im!XICl Study Commission Act. I'ub, L No. 104.169, 110 Sf". 1 4~2 (199(,) 
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included a scandal involving political contributions linked to White HOllse 
coffees: 
Start with the guess-who's-coming-to-cofTcc list at the White 
House. . [F]or exa mpl e, one White House coffee guest was the 
chairwoman of the Oneida Nation. an Indian tribe with gambling 
interests. On thai same day, according to the Wall Street Journal, 
the Oneida alion donated $30.000 to the Democratic National 
Committee. Coffee guest lists show at least 10 representatives of 
Ind ian gambling i1l(crests since mid_1995.82 
Eventually, one of PresidcnI Cl inton's appointees was Robert W. 
Loescherg who was unabashedly protect ive of Native A merican gambling interests. 3 Other candidates who lopped the Clinton appointment list and 
whom President Clinton eventually appointed were: 
Richard Leone, who is close to New Jersey Rep. Roben G 
Torrieelli, a strong supporter of the Atlantic City gambling industry 
{who was forced to quit the U.S. Senate in 2002 due to scandals]: 
and Bill Bible, chainnan of the Nevada Gaming Control Board. 
According to the Las Vegas Sun. Sen. Harry Re id of Nevada was 
assured by a top White House aide last October [1996] thai Mr. 
Bible's selection was a "done deal.,,&4 
Despite these initial concerns, Commissioner Leone's subsequent 
service on the Commission was reasonable and objeclivc. 85 Bill Bible, 
however, argued for pro-gambling interests whi ch included bas ica lly 
unrestricted campai&'ll contributions fro m the industry and the legalization 
of gambling on interco llegiate spons86 - positions rejected by virtually 
every state except Nevada. After serving on the U.S. Gambling 
Commission, Bill Bib le was tapped to be the president of one of the 
gambling industry's major trade organizations, the Nevada Reson 
Assoc iation. 
Numerous other pro-gambl ing individuals also received appointments. 
For examp le. one of Speaker Newt Gingric h's two Commission 
appointments went to 1. Terrence Lanni, the CEO and chair of a casino 
company in Las Vegas.n Additionally. House M inority Leader Richard 
Gephardt who got "one selection - and whosc political committees 
received at least $46,500 fro m gambling interests along with another 
$4,500 from three women listed as homemakers from Las Vegas 
[appointed pro-gambling Commiss ioner John Wilhelm] . .. the head of a 
il Editorial. Gambling Payoff!, WASIL POST. Feb. 10. 1997. at Al8 [hereinafter GtJ1fIbiing 
P,n'OlPl (emphasis added) 
oJ See, e_g .. l\GISC fE!'IAL REPORT. supra nOle 3. at App [(Statement of Roben W. Loescher). 
5< Gumb/"'g Pumff!. supt'tJ note 82. at A18 . 
• , See. e_g_. I\GISC FI!'IAl REPORT. supra note J. at App. I ($Iatement of R.chard C. Leone). 
n See id. (statements by \\ illtam A. Bible). After the NGISC. Bill Bible became president of the 
"Il'''ada Resort Association. a major trade orgamzatlOo vl1Ihm the asmblLnJj mdLlliLry. Bill Bible 's wife 
began serving In the "'c\,adn AUorn~y G~ne",l's office in Las Vegas in 1991, and became the Asslitam 
Chief Deputy Attorney General for Ncvada in Januaty 200 1. SlLll Capital Bur, AG Picb Ne ... BOH for 
Lw. Vi}'u;\' Office, LAS VFGIIS SUN, Jan. 4, 2001 (on llIe with the author). 
I, (jambling i'a)'Ojp. Sllpru note 82. at Al8 
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union representing casino employees. "g~ It was not surprising that the 
legislat ive sRonsors of the Commission were outraged at these 
appoimmems.89 The academic community needs to be aware of these 
concerns, as well as the difficult research environment they create.90 
In Volume 22 of Managerial and Decision Economics, Economics 
professors Earl Grinols and David Mustard produced and published a 2001 
research summary of the partial socio-economic costs associated with the 
creation of each new pathological gambler. Their figure of $13,586 on 
average (including the low "partial cost" estimates of $1,200 of the 
Christiansen Associates-NORC Group) is summarized in the tables in the 
Appendix .91 Extrapolated to the national level, the annual total U.S. costs 
assoc iated with a nationwide casino expansion were 540.1 billion per year 
(compared with the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's "partial costs" 
of 55 billion).92 
Critics have suggested that, with a 51.25 million budget from the 
National Commission, the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group should 
have produced a more comprehensive list of socia-economic costs, as was 
clearly intended by the members of Congress who sponsored the 
Commission. In comparison, the Grinols and Mustard article written as 
normal academic discourse for MDE Volume 22 not only made a leading-
edge attempt to iden tify and define several of those socia-economic costs, 
but also considered and reviewed the previous literarure. The fo llowing 
analysis considers both of these research projects, as well as numerous 
others, as it details the early defin itions of the 1980s and 1990s, and 
provides the historical context for futu re analyses. 
~ Id 
" fd 
.. See id. 
" Compare Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard. Business Projilubihly \.'S. Social Projiwbl/uy: 
Em/aming Indll)·/fles wi/h Ex/emu/iries. The Case ojCusinos. 22 J\.tANAGERJAL & DEC. ECON. 143, 
153-55 & Tables 2-4 (2001) [hereinafter [,·o{uuring Cas;IIosj "jlh NGISC FI"AL REPORT, supm note J. 
at 4-14 (reporling the Christiansen Associates -NORC Group's results as S1.200 parlial costs per 
pathological gambler per year). See Frank L. Qumn. Firsl Do No Harm: Whal Could He Done by 
Casinos ro Limit Pathological Gambling. 22 MANAGERtAL & DEC. ECON. 13J (2001) . See generally 
Ricardo C. Gazel. Dan S. Rickman & William N Thompson. Casino Gambling & Crime: A "one! 
51l1dy of Wisconsin COllnties. 22 MA:-1AGERtAL & DEC. ECON. 65 (200 1). For definitive analyses ofthe 
costs and benefils, see EARL L. GRINOLS. GAMBLING IN AMERICA COSTS "NO BENEFITS (Cambndge 
Vni~. Press 20(4) [heremafler GAMBU:-10 COSTS] (confinning the !alio acccpled since at leaSI 1994: 
tllal the legalized gambling cOStfbcnefil ratio is approximately $3 in COS1S for every S I in benefits) 
.: Compare EWlbwlmg Cosmos. )·upru note 91. at 154-55. Tables 3-4 . .... ith NGISC FINAL RLroRT. 
supra oote 3. at4-14 (reportmg the Chnsliansen Associares-NQRC Group's rcsullS as S5 billion in IOtal 
V.S. costs per year), wilh Mega -Lo .... slIIts, SliP'" note 15. at 44, Table AJ (eiling the costs "'ng.,,; of 
'·arioU5 e:>..pens at belween S24-S88 billion). 
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8. DEFrNlNGTHE SocIo-ECONO~lIC COSTS OF EACH PATHOLOGICAL AND 
PROBLEM GAMBLER: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE 1980s 
AND 1990s 
Despite the new tax revenues, the soc io-economic costs of legalizing 
gambling activities create real costs for taxpayers and state governments. 
To compensate for these costs, taxes must theoret ically be increased dollar 
for dollar. Since state governments are unlikely to raise taxes dollar for 
dollar, the alternatives are the following: (1 ) divert dollars from education 
to address the increased soc ial-welfare and crime costs: (2) transfer many 
of these costs to "charitable organizations": (3) adjust to a decline in the 
pre-existing "quality of life" values; (4) raise laxes somewhat ; (5) transfer 
many of the societal costs such as "rehabi litative costs" to businesses; or 
(6) implement some or all of these strategies to some extent. This las! 
scenario is the most likely to occur. It should be noted, however, that all of 
these increased costs to taxpayers and state governments can be simply 
avo ided by not legalizing gambling activities. 
For years, members of the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group have 
been directly or indirectly associated editorially with the publication of 
articles that attempted to delineate the socio-economic costs of pathological 
and problem gambling.93 However, the Christiansen Associates-NORC 
Group does not appear to address important precedents such as the research 
article by Robert M. Politzer, James S. Morrow. and Sandra B. Leavey 
(hereinafter Johns Hopkins Reportr in the Journal of Gambling Behavior 
(which was renamed the Journal of Gambling Studies in 1996). 
On its editorial page. the Journal of Gambling Srudies is designated as 
the "Official Journal of the National Council on Problem Gambling: Co· 
sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Gambling and Commercial 
Gaming,,95 (the institute is located in Reno, Nevada). In the late 19905, 
Keith Whyte, a former representat ive of the American Gaming Assoc iation 
(AGA), the gambling industry's lobbying group in Washington, D.C., 
., ComjI(Jre. e.g. . Editorial BoardlReviewers. 1 J. GAMBU"G BEHAV. ....·ilh Editorial 
BoardlReviewers, 5 J. GA\IBLING BEHAV .• and Eduorial i3<>ardIRevic\\cl"S. 10 1. GAMBLING STUDIES 
(successor publication to J GII\fBLlNG BEHAV.). 
""' Roben M. Politzcr. Reporl on Ihf CO$I·Se"'fil/Effrx:/I'·,'ne$s ofTreutmenl 01 the Johns //opKins 
Cenler for Pathological Gamh/ing. I 1. GAMBLING BEHAV. 131 (1985) (the Journal of Gambling 
Behavior was renamed the Jou"",l of Gambling Studi'" in 1996) [hereinafter Johns Hop/r;ins Reporl} . 
See also Raben M. Politzer. Repon on Ihe Societal CoM of Pwh%glml Gambling and Ihe Coli/-
Benefit/Effectiveness of r"'o/",<,nl, presented 0/ The Fifth National Conference on Gambling and Risk 
Takmg 1981) [heremafter Politzer el al.]. For another example of a "costs"' art icle in the JOURNAL Of 
GA'\.IBLlNG BEHAVIOR, see Henry Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, Ins. Problems and Pathological C(1mb/ing. 
3 J. GAMBLlNG BEIlAV. 123 (1987) [hereinafter Le!;ieur & Puig] . For examples of other well-known 
publications/anitles examining the deilmltahon of costs. see 138 COl'0. Roc. S 187 (da ily ed. Jan 22. 
1992): TASK FORCE 0'-1 GM1BLlNCi ADDICTION I ... MARYLAr-.:O (1990) [hereinafter GAMBLING 
ADDICnON IN MARYLAND]: NATIO:-"Al CENTER fOR PAnlOlOGIClIl GAMBLING, AN OV~RVlbW OF 
PATHOLOGICAL GAMIlLl;--.G 3 (19\10); Henry Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling. SOCtETV. May/Junc 1992. 
at 42. 43: Henry u:sieur, Campulsi.-e G(1mbl;"g.· Documcnlmg rhe Soci<ll & EconomiC COSIS 1 (Apr. 
D, 1991) (available from Professor l\enry Lcsieur) [hereinaftcr Lesieur. Economic Costsl 
OJ See. e.g.. Editorial Board, 151. GAMBU'IG STUI.JtES (1999). 
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became the executive director of the National Council on Problem 
Gambling, while William Eadington headed the Institute for the Study of 
Gambling and Commerc ial Gaming in Reno , Nevada. The predecessor 
Journal of Gambling Behavior, then under the editorship of we ll-respected 
Professor Henry Lesieur, publi shed the Johns Hopkins Report in 1985?' 
In the early 1990s, the Johns Hopkins Report by Politzer, as well as 
other academic literature on the socia-economic costs of legalized 
gambling, established the parameters of the issues.'n In 1994, in order to 
facilitate analyses of the socia-economic costs of pathological gamblers, 
the prevailing literature (lncluding the "lower" cost estimates whic h were 
perhaps somewhat influenced by pro-gambling interests) was summarized 
in a comprehensive table. Q& Subsequent academic efforts resulted in the 
200 I article~ by economics professors Earl Grinols and David Mustard. 
and some of its leading-edge tables are reproduced in this analysis as an 
appendix. loo It is important to review the literature published prior to 1995 
~ panicularly the 1985 Johns Hopkins Report ~ in order to ascenain the 
historical perspective that existed befo re the gambling industry 's lobbying 
group, the AGA, began to influence the debate. lol The fo llowing is a 
summar), of that hi storical perspect ive and its relevance to modem 
research. 
Once gamblin fu is legalized in a venue, the number of pathological and problem gamblers 2 in the population rises. It can easi ly double wi th)n 1 
to 5 years beca use of the accessibility and acceptability of gambling.lO~ In 
.. John;' Hopkins Repon. supra note 94. 
,: For a compendi llm of the prevailing litenltllre. sec the footnotes In John W. Kind!, The 
Economic Impucts of l£gaJi:1:d Gambling AClil·itie .• , 43 DR./IKIi L. RE \ ·. 51,90·95, ",,_272-90 (1994) 
[heremafter Ecortomic Impacts]. 
0lI Economic Imp{lcl~. supra note 97, Table 3. at 90-95 nn.272-90 . 
... Ew.Juating Casinos. supra note 91, at 153-55, Tables 2-4. 
,00 ld. See i1ffra Table and accompanying footnotes 
'0' See generally johns HopkIns Report. supra notc 94: I'ol iczer ct aI., supra note 94. 
01 for the delimitation of a pathological gambler, see A\[ PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATlO:-; ,. 
DIAG"'OSTIC A"-ill STATISTICAL MA"'UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 615·1 8, § 312.31 (4th cd. 1994) 
(""patholo@.lcal gambling") [ht"TCinaftcr DSM-IV], Compure id . ... Itn A~t PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATIOK_ 
DIAG:"'OSTIC A"'[) STATISTICAL MANuAL OF ME""TAL DtSORDERS 324-25. § 31 2.31 (3d rev, cd. 1987) 
[hereinaft~r DSM-I II] , 
For analyses of the social and economic aspects of pathological gambling. see HENRY R. LESI[UR. 
REPORTO-': PATHOLOGICAL GAMBU:"'G I, /'o[W JERSEY (1988); Johns 110pkins Report. supra nOte 94: L 
Sommers. PuthoJo/lKu{ Gambling: Estimating Prevalence and Grou{J C~amclerislics. 23 INT'L J. 
ADDICTIONS 477 (1988); Rachel Volbcrg. Estimating the Prevalence of Pathological Gambling lB the 
United States ( 1992) (on file with author): Rachel Volberg & Henry J. Steadman, Refining Pre"a{eflce 
Estimates of Pathological Gambling, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 502 ( 1988): Rache l Volberg & Henry J. 
Steadman, Problem Gambling in Iowa (",s~arch study funded by /'oat 'l Inst. Memal lIealth & Iowa 
Dep't Human Serv, 1989). Rachel Volberg & Randall M. Steufcn, Gambling and Problem Gamb li ng in 
South Dakota (199 1) (on file with author). 
,0) See, ego Di v_ AddictionS. Harvard Med,cal School. ESlImating [he Prevalence of Disordered 
Gamblin@. Behavior In the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis. App_ II (Howard J , Shaffer. 
Matthew N. Hall. & Joni Vander Bi lt. Dec. 15. 1997) [heremafter Hanard Addiellons Meta-analysisl; 
Pr~ss Rekase of Harvard ,\1cdleal School. '"Harvard 1>.1cdical School Researchers Map Prevalence of 
Gambhng Disorders In Nonh Amerit a" Dec. 4. 1<197 (From _84% in 1993. "the prnalellc.,; nile fOT 
1994·1997 grew to 1.29 percent of the adult poPlilatlon_") [hercinal'icr Haryard Division on Addictions 
-
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the early 1990s, the "doubling rule" theorized that all costs associated with 
pathological gambling would increase by at least 100% once gambling was 
legalized in a juri sdiction. lM Pursuant to Volberg's 1992 field research, the 
"findings suggest that the introduction of widespread legal gambling, 
including pull tabs, casinos and video lottery tennioals, was associated with 
a 1% (100 basis points) increase in the prevalence rate of problem and 
probable pathological gambling over a 2-year period.,,105 This observation 
was made of the adult problem and probab le pathological gamblers. This 
type of increase in the prevalence rates appeared to be 100% greater among 
the teenage population. I06 
In the 1990s, it was predicted that when more long-term field data 
became available, a framework for projecting the future number of 
pathological gamblers could be based on the following formula: 107 
NG = Noemt, 
where No is the projected number of pathological gamblers, and No is the 
number of pathological gamblers in the initial period. Taking the baseline 
1975 prevalence rate lOS of .0077, and multiplying it by the population (or 
more precisely, the adult population of an area in 1975) produces the No. 
The time in years is represented by t. The rate of growth of pathological 
gambling is represented by 111, which might be zero (or some low number) 
before gambling is legalized in a state (or in a particular population base) 
and some positive number thereafler. 109 
The previous equation may be translated linearly by taking the 
logarithms of the equation and placing it in estimation form as fol1ows:" O 
In NG = In No+mt 
Because more extensive field research needs to be conducted to 
calculate 111, more precise numbers depend on future research results. The 
1975 baseline prevalence rates, however, are well established and the 
recent prevalence rates can be and have been accurately calculated. 
Although 0.17% per year was an apparent growth rate in pathological 
gamblers from 1994 to 1997, the annualized rale of growth in pathological 
Press Release). See also Statement of John W"arrcn Kindt, Uni\'. of 111, to the National Gambling 
Impact Siudy Commission, '·U.S. and Imcnmliona[ Conccrns o\cr the Socia-Economic COSIS of 
Legalized Gamblmg: Grealerthan the 1l1egal [)rug l'TOblcm?," Chicago, 111., May2[. 1998, Figures 
1-5, Tables 1-3 [hereinafter U.s. and [nternational Costs]. 
, .... BETTER GoVERNMEl'>"T ASSOCIATION, STAFF WHITE PAPER: CASINO GAMDLIl'G [N OtlCAGO 2 
(1992) [hereinafter BGA REPORT]: sec. e,g., Economic Impacts. supra note 97, at 65-66. 
,0.\ Letter from Rachel Volbcrg. Presidcnt, Gemini Research, 10 John Warren Kindt Professor. 
Umversity of illinOIS 2 (Dec. 23, [992) [hereinafter Lencr from Volbcrg to Kindt). 
lOti SCI! infra notes ll4-ll5 and accompanying text 
'07 Lclter from Economics l'rofessor Jane Leuthold, Un,versity of Illinois, to John Warren Kindt, 
Professor, University of [[[inois (feb. 25, 1993) (on file with the a\lthor) [hcreinafter Letter from 
Leuthold to Kindt]. 
, .. U.S. COMM'N a. .. MBLlNG, supra Olltc 30. at 73. 
!(N Leuer from Leuthold to Kindt, wpra note 107, at [. 
u" fd, 
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gambling may await furore research. lIowever. by 1997, the fact thal lhere 
will be an increase in the number of pathological gamblers once gambling 
is legalized was well established by the Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis 
at an additional 0.5% of the population, or 1.5 10 2.2 milli on new 
pathological gamblers between 1994 and 1997. ll1 
As reported in 1992. the majority of experts I 12 were already estimating 
that 1.5 to 5% of the populations of slates ancVor state locales where 
gambling was legal we re pathological and prob lem gamblers. 113 
Accordingly, to project th is figure into the immediate future was not 
unreasonable - particularly becallsc the next generation, the teenage 
population, was already evidenc ing gambling addiction rates of 4 to 
\5%.114 Prior to 1990, Dr. Durand Jacobs of the Lorna Linda University 
Medical School reported a more widely accepted mnge of 4 to 5%. 115 For 
prevalence rates among the adult population during the early 19905, 
Volber~ reported, for example, thirteen studies with a range of' 1.5 to 
6.3%.\ These gambli ng percentages paralleled percentages in a 1992 
Gallup poll. l17 The percentage of the popu lation admitting thai "gambling 
caused family problems" was 5%, the percentage who enjoyed gambling '·a 
lot" was 7%, and the percentage admitting they gambled "too much" was 
10%. liS 
In 1994. the majority of academic/expert literature pointed to an 
increasing trend in Ihe numbers of pathological and problem gamblers. 
Starting at 0.77% pathologica l gamblers and 2.33% problem gamblers 
de facto in 1976,119 pathological rates were trending into the I to 2% range 
by 1994. 121) The increased rates applied to states with widespread legalized 
gambling, such as state lotteries. There was an academic debate about the 
degree to which state lotteries contributed to thi s problem. but the ultimate 
eonsenSliS was that the problem would be mitigated by the absence or state 
lotteries. 121 There was litt le doubt, however, that states would reach these 
"I .'i<'I', .'g. I!arvard Addictions Meta·analysis.supra note 103. a143. Tuble 131111d 51. Table 16; 
lIaInrd DIVision on Addichons Press Relea~. "'<1'1"11 nOle 103 (from 0.84% 10 1993, ··the pn:,"alcn~~ 
rate for 1994·1997 grew to 1.29 percent ofl t>c adult population."'). 
, S ... • eg BOA REPORT. 'Ullra note 104, at 30. 
m ,d 
" !tJ For analyses of "POrts gambhng as the ·· introductory drug~ hooking young J1eOIllc 10 
gamhling . • c~ John W Kmdt & Thomas Amm, en//!'ge and Amuttwr Span .• Gambling. Gilmb/ing 
A,,·u-," OUf lou/Ii?, 8 VtLL. SI'()R1S & ENT. L. J. 221 (2002) 
I" Durnnd F Jacobs, IIIL"gal (md Undocrlmemed.· A Rel'in<' of 7i!en(lgl' Gambling and {he Pbghl 
of ChiJdrt'n of 1'tT)/)lem Gl1mbl~.,.s 111 Anu.,.ica. in COMPLL '>IYE G,\I.4HLI"n: THEORY. RUiLARClI, ","SO 
PRACTrn· 249 (I loward J. Shaffer e! al. I'ds. 19l!9) 
" .. Letter frum \'olb"'1: 10 Kmdt. supra note lOS (repol1 lOg and sununarizinJ.: 13 ~tl.ldll:S ,n the 
Table ·'Compamon of Lir~rl"", I'rcvalence Kares of Problem and Pathological Gamblel"li by Slatc~). 
lL" G(()rge Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll, 1'1I/)/It· Opinion 1';1$11. SCIIOLARLY RF<;OlMC~S, INC. 
(\993) IheTCmancr NEWS SERVICr- 12-16·92]. \(0,," pathological and problem gambhng IS defined III 
reference to t~is poll probahly dtffers substanhally from more refilled definitions occep!ed by 2000. 
However. in 1992, rhis poll "·as widely c ited by sociologists. 
Itlld. 
11. U.S COI.4I.4·N GMlIIUNc., !I/pro note 36. ar 73. 
'''' ~'( •. t'.g. £~·QiWmu· fIltIIllC/.~. ~uf"a lIOl e 97, ar 89, Table 2. 
IlL See. e.R .. I\GISC I'INAL ll.[f'ORT. Sllpra lIOl e 3, "14·1 to 4·20, 5·4 I 
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numbers more quick ly once they legalized the "faster" fonns of gambling, 
such as riverboat gambling, casino gambling, and video-machine gambling 
(i.e .. the "crack-cocaine" of pathological gamblers). 121 
Initiated in 1981 and finalized in 1985. the Johns Hopkins Report 
established sevcml para meters for delimiting the socio-economic COSIS of 
pathologica l gamblers (or what the industry likes to tenn "compulsive 
gamblers"'). A review of the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's 
submissions to the 1999 u.s. Gambling Commiss ion suggests that the 
Group apparently gave cursory, if any, consideration to these baseline 
efforts. Arguably. the Group could establish new baselines and definitions 
al its discret ion, but these changes should have improved upon and 
differentiated themselves from the standards estab lished by the Johns 
Hopkins Reporl. Wi th a $1.25 mi llion budget. ll3 the Group appeared to 
have the resources to make such analyses. 124 
For example, the Johns Hopkins Report suggested that "average" 
compulsive (pathological ) gamblers should consist of those compulsive 
gamblers "who are al the beginning stages of their gambling add ict ion.,,125 
Cost estimates can also be vicwed in a longcHerm analysis. The marginal 
costs of legalizing gambling activities can extend years (and evcn 
generations) into the future. A standard costlbcncfit analysis could project 
these costs into the futurc. and an appropriate discount rate could be used to 
sum the discounted values of the costs associatcd with legalizing 
gambling. Ill> As suggested in 1994, the following fonnula might be used: 
C ~ L C,I(1 +,)'. 
In this fonnula , C constitutes the present value of discounted future costs . 
Cr consists of the annual projected cost in year t. while the rate of discount 
is represented by r.127 
Throughout thc 19805 and 1990s. the Johns Hopkins Report and 
subsequent literature established the parameters of the debate for socio-
economic COSts. It was remarkable that the work of the 
Christiansen/Cummings Associ ates~NORC Group made only cursory, if 
In Id, at 5·5, 4·1 to 4·20 &'i' alsa \r,veca Novak. Th,,~ C,,11 rI Vldell Craci:;. TIMf-. June 1. 1998. 
at 58. See generally John W. Ktndt. Legafi:"d Gambling Am"'li.,.· The In",.s I"""I..,,,!!. Murk.'1 
Salllrar;"". 15 N. llL- U. L REV. 211 (1995), 
In Tool' Batt. Cusinos l>elrlJhled by Smd} Fmdrng<. LI'.~ VFGA~ R~v·J., Feb, Q. 1m, al Dl 
[hereinafter Casinos D,dighred by Studyl, 
'bOld 
on BGA REPORT, supra noce IOJ, at 15 (qUOlmg Robert M Poliller d al.. :fIlpra TM)I ~ 94. at 8·10) 
By comparison. Ihr larger social COSts "'en: reflected in those pathologIcal gamblers who welC m lhe 
laler stages of gambhn¥ addict tOn and had ··bo1l0mro·oul,·' Id (eiling Po!tlzer et a l ,supra nOIC 94. al 
9·tO). See alro GAMBlIl'oG AOUICTIO' I' MARYLAND. supra lIOIe 9J. al 59-61. II should be nOl~ lital 
\'mually all of lhrse eslirn:tl",; an: based on male subjec15 3.5 recorded in GI'.MHLI'G ADDICTION IN 
MARYLA:"D. When adJtb!Cd for tnflal10n as of 1992. lite S52.ooo pc"r }~r COSI for a oomJlutsi\c 
¥lImblcr inc reased 10 S53,000 per year. BGA REPORT, supra note 104. at 14. 
'''' Letter from Leuthold to Kindt, 5Upra nOle 107,31 1·2 
or Id. at 2: Ut ge"traily CIlARU$ CLOTFELTER & PlHLLIP COOI<- S~LlI:"G HOl'r (H~rv~nl 1Jl1i\ 
Press 1989) 
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any, citation to the Johns Nopkins Report and related literature. 128 This 
scenario became more unusual, considering that two orthe four component 
authors of the Christiansen/Cummings Associates and Gemini Research 
Group (but notably not the NORC) were long-time editorial review 
members of the journ<l1 in which the Jvhns Hopkins RepnYI and subsequent 
rcilltcd art icles were published. While the work of the NORC in similar 
sociological areas was widely accepted, it could be argued tha i the NORC's 
research for the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission was its first experience 
with gambling-related issues. and. therefore, the NORC was to some extent 
rel iant upon information and direct ion provided by those influencing Ihe 
Commission - part icularly pro-gambling Commissioners,129 as well as 
researchers too closely associated with pro-gambling interests. 
A research endeavor such as the $1.25 million etTon engaged in by the 
Christiansen/Cu mmings Associates-NO RC Group should not , and perhaps 
can not, ignore the Johns f{opkins Report and related litcmtllre. There arc 
almost two decades of prcccdent since the initial Politzer effoll, 130 
including the 1985 Johns Hopkins Report,HI the 1990 Politzer coauthored 
Maryland Government Report, Task Force on Gambling Addiction in 
}./ary/(llu/,112 and relatcd literature that must also be academically 
addressed . Accordi ngly, a brief review of the socio-economic costs 
categories for pathological and problem gamblers that wcre proposed and 
published in the 1985 Johns Hopkins Report is appropriate. These 
categories const itute the starting point for a blueprint of the socio-economic 
costs categories of pathological and problem gambl ers. The 
Christia nsen/C ummings Associates-NORC Group's detenninations can 
only add to this blueprint. 
It should also be nOled th at for years, the gambling industry denied that 
there were any socio-economic costs associated with pathological and 
problem gambling. m Bcginning in the mid-1990s, the lobbyists for the 
gambling industry decided not to repeat the public relations mi stakes of the 
tobacco industry, and admined that thcre were costs associated with 
excessive gambl ing. I')'! Even J. Terrence lanni, the CEO ofMGM Grand, 
Inc., ra ised these issues to groups in the industry after he was appointed by 
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to be a Co mmissioner on the 
1996- 1999 U.S. Gambling Commi ssion: 
Lanni said his ind ust ry has to be more aggressive about problem 
gambling. Until recent efforts by the American Gaming 
Association (whi ch is funding a Harvard study on the issue), he 
In See ~~I'rally ChnSlian.t'Tl A')Oc.-NORC 1999 Study. SUpril note 14, 31 referencc_; 
Chrlsuansct1 Assoc.-'>IORC 19Q9 O\'CrvlCW Suo-cy. supra note 14, at referencc,: ChnSlians.cn Assoc,-
NORC 19')9 Slid .. ;; Sun.cy DaI3bJl>C.M,pril Il()Ic 14. ComjNlre ,d. _ ",11> mira fOQlnotes130-13 1. 
IN See. e.g .. GamNing SUrve,l'. supra note 22, al Dl. 
''" 1'01117.o:r ~ al., s"pra nol" 94. 
I), Su ~"era/(I' Jonm Hoplu,,~ Report. SIIpra not .. lJ4. 
III S.,/' !,:c"l'rall) G.v.lf1L1NG ADOlCl lON IN \1ARYLAND. slipra note 114. 
'" For a brlef r,,';,," Ofl~; ' 1",torIC31 scenario. sec Mf!gll-La..,<utrs. wpra Mte 15, a128-29 & 
1111.187·98. 
1)4 !d. I 
J 
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said, "we have been less than fOl1hrighl abo ut compulsive 
gambling.,,1)5 
Accordingly. a basic review of the socia-economic costs categories 
established by the Johns Hopkins Report is beneficiaL Several COSlS 
categories were initially delimited as the blueprint for future studies and 
research. 
I. "Abused Dollars " a.k.a. "Lost C01lSumer Dollars " 
From an economic perspective, the leon " lost consumer dollars" 
equates well wilh the sociological concept of "abused dollars," and these 
two concepts may be defined as "[eJstimates of the average annual amount 
obtained legally <lnd/or illegally by the pathological gambler which 
otherwise would have been used by the pathological gambler, his family, or 
his victims for other essential purposes."m According to Dr. Politzer and 
his associates: 
These abused doll(lrs include earned income put at risk in 
gambling, borrowed andlor illegally obtained dollars spenl on basic 
needs andlor provided 10 the family which otherwise would have 
been 'covered ' by Ihal fract ion of earned income which was used 
for gambl ing, and borrowed amI/or illegally obtained dollars for 
the partial payment of gambling related debls. 137 
From a bus iness-economic viewpoint, "~lost consumer dollars" are the 
equivalent of "consumer dollars lost to tradi60nal business sa les," which is 
also the equi valent of "gambling dollars gaincd by gambling 
organizations." The "lost consumer dollars" figure includes $15,000 per 
year in lost liquid assets,lJ8 
2. "Lm/ Productivity" a.k.a. "Lost Work Proc!ucriviry" 
The JoJItI,\ H()pkil1~ Report also delimited "lost productivity." From the 
business-economic viewpoint. " lost work producti vity" is the conceptual 
equivalent of the soc iological tenn, "Iosl productivity," which is defined as 
"[e]st imates of percent of time lIot engaged in the production of goods and 
services for wh ich the individual was employed, mult iplied by the average 
gross annual salary:·ll~ Characteristic examples of lost productivity in the 
m Fred rausl, Gambfilrg Lemler's li,rnirrg /(} Polilimf. Soclilf Mllllel"\. ST. LOUIS Poo,"T·DISPi\T<;H. 
Iftx.16,1~,at 14 
,,. Johns Hupkllu Ht·porl. ~lIlff(j ,IQI" 94. at 133. BGA R~;P()KT, fUpro note 104, 31 15; I'()htzcret 
aI., 'UfII"Q nOlt 94, at 9. Set a/.ro 1:.'1'afuming Casinos. iJuprll Jl()te 91, at 152 ("Abused Dollars'l. 
m Joh/U HopklflS Reporl, ;,It{ffll lIot" Q4. at 133; BGA REI'ORT,lIIpra Jl()te 104, al 15; PollllCr el 
al., wpra Mle 94, al 9. 
'.>$ This colI"".-.al ;'t SI5.000 per year figun: is used IlIlhn analysLs 'IIStead of the hLgher S42.QOO 
per year (ill 1985 <krlJars) in the Juhn:, Hopkins Repon s..'e John, / 101'1011$ Repfm, supra note 94, al 
137. For an analysis of the strategIc and regional Impacts of " Iosl ~onsumer dollars," see John W. 
K.mdl. D""inishmg Or N1'!IlIImg Ihl' MIII/iplier Effec/: The Tro/l.Sftr of Consumer Dollars /0 Lt'gi/h:<"I1 
Gamhling:Slwufd A N('gati"/! Soc/O-EcIHlOmic "Crime Mullif//wl"" Be Included in Gambling 
Co .• tlBen<jil Anal ... ~c.I~, 2003 \tICH. Sf. DeL L. Rev. 281. 
'" BOA REPORT. ~"IIpf{/ note \04 , at 8: Politzer (I aI., supra note 94. al 8 (emphasIs ongillu l lo 
Poli ller el al.). 
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life of a pathological gambler include "inattention to work,,140 and 
jeopardizing or losing a "job" or "career opportunity.',141 The lost 
productivi ty of the abused or distracted spouse should also be added as a 
cost-whether the spouse eVinces a loss in family productivity and child 
care, or has lost a more quantifiable percentage of work time from a job 
(such as 10% losl time from a £40,000 per year work year). 142 
3. "Crime Costs" a.ka. "White-Collal" Crime Costs" 
From a government perspective, "white-collar crime costs" equate with 
the sociological concept of "crime costs," and are defined as "[e]stimates of 
the average annual law enforcement, adjudication. and detention costs fo r 
the typical type of 'white collar' crime committed by pathological gamblers 
multiplied by the average number of violations of the law per pathological 
gambler.,,!43 These costs arise because pathological gamblers frequentIx 
engage in "financially motivated illegal activitics to pay for gambl ing."] 4 
It should be notcd that the high '·regu latory costs" of administering and 
monitoring the legalized gambling activities are not generally included in 
these formulas, but they are significant, and should be incorporated into the 
overall costs. Because of the large number of private security guards 
traditionally associated with casino gambling, these "security costs" might 
also be factored into future modifications of these cost estimates, especially 
when the security consists of state police and/or regu lators provided at 
taxpayer expense. These costs are increased by the presence of security 
guards around casinos because they generall y tend to move some types of 
criminal activities away from casino areas. 
For purposes of thi s analysis, "white-collar crime costs" include costs 
due to forgery, check forgery, embezzlement, employee theft, tax evasion, 
tax fraud, and insurance fraud. These subcategories are used because they 
correlate with the crimes most frequently committed by pathological 
gamblers. 145 
4. '"Incarceration Costs" a.k.a. "Imermediare Incarceratiol/ Cos/s" 
"Intermed iate incarcerat ion costs" equate with the soc iological term 
" incarceration costs" and are defined as "[e]stimates of the average 
confinement costs for a typical crime committed by pathological gamblers 
multiplied by the average number of such crimes committed per 
pathological gambler. ,,!46 These costs would be higher. but courts tend to 
divert pathological gamblers to treatment programs and/or rcquirc 
,«I DSM.I]!. ~·upra note 102. at 324 . 
... DSM·IV, supra note 102. at 618 (Sec. 312.31). See also John W. Kmdt. The ,vega/he ImpaCI! 
of L'"ga/b,d Gumblll1g on B".,ine.'II!-,". 4 U. MIA\t] BUS. L. 1. 93 (1994) 
;., So't" John:,· HopkinI Repon. Illpra note 94. 31 J41 
!OJ OG.-\ RnORT, Slipra note 104, al 15; Politlcr CI al.. .Iupra nOle 94, a18. 
, .. DSM·!I!.lllpra note 102. al 324. 
" See Leslcur. Economic Costs. supra nOlI.' 94. Table 2. al 21. Si'C generallv Leslcur & PUlg. 
S1/pra note 94: ",creased Crime a~d Legali::ing Gambling, Slipra nOle 2 
.. BGA RErORT,SUpra note 104. at 15: PolJtzer Cl al.. sup'" nOle 94. at 9 
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restitution. Given that successfully completing the treatment program 
and/or making restitution often results in ·'clearing the record" of the 
pathological gambler, it is quite difficult to calculate some of the costs in 
this mea. There is, however. a high recidivist rate among pathological 
gamblers. 
5. Subtotal afSocia-Economic Costs of Pathological Gamblers 
Regardl ess of subsequent claims by pro-gambling interests to the 
contrary, the majority of the academ ic/government source materials of 1992 
were reporting 552,000 (in 1992 dollars) as the most conservative and 
frequent ly utilized sociological cost of a pathological gambler per ycar. 147 
This included only partial costs, specifically: 
1. abused dollars or lost consumer dollars, 
2. lost productivity or lost work productivity, 
3. crime costs or white-collar crime costs, and 
4. intermediate incarceration costS.1 48 
What sociologists were adding to these partial costs were other 
categories of costs, namely: 
1. long-term incarceration costs, 
2. rehabilitative costs, 
3. debt accumulation, 
4. other socia-economic costs, 
5. commonplace crime costs, and 
6. gambling system crime costS.1 49 
Spec ific definitions and categories needed to be refined to prevent the 
overlapping of costs estimates, but in the 1980s and 1990s the academic 
literature had already begun the process. 
6. "Long-Term Incarceration Costs" a.k.a. '"Long-Term 
Imprisonment COStS" 
"Long-term imprisonment costs" are defined as the long-term costs of 
incarcerating a pathological gambler per year. In 1994, these costs were 
S25,OOO per year for young prisoners, but due to the increased medical 
costs and oilier factors, thesc costs climbcd to S50,000 per year for elderly 
prisoners. 150 Given that 13 percent to 15 percent of all pathological 
,.' BGA REPORT. supra nOle 104. at 12· 1 7 . 
... See ~"I'ra foollKlles 136-146 and accompanying text 
... &e il1fra notes t50-166 and accompanymg text. Since at least 1994. the calculable costs to the 
taxpayers have been $3 for every $1 in benefits. See lupra, note 91 and accompanying text See 
gellerully John W. Kmdt. iA'galiz,'d Gambling AClivilies As Subsidl:.>d by Taxpayers, 48 ARK. L REv 
889 (1995). 
I~ Costs provided by bolh the U.S Department of Justice. Illinois Department Corrections and the 
CompulSive Gambltng Center til Baillmore. Maryland (1992) [h('rctllafl('r CGC Costs). 
200]] The Gambling Industry and AcademIc Research 25 
gamblers arc incarcerated for the long~tenn, the total costs as a function of 
"all patholog ica l gamblers" would be 53,750 per year for younger prisoners 
and $7,500 per year for elderly prisoners. ' 1 These costs may overlap 
somewhat with the sociological category of "incarcerat ion COSIS,,,152 but 
incarceration costs are morc appropriately considered to be predominantly 
shan-term or intermediate incarceration costs. 
7, "Rehabiliralive Costs" a.k.a. "Rehabilitation Costs" 
From both a sociological and legal standpoint, "rehabilitative costs" are 
defined as the costs of making the pathological gambler "whole again." In 
1992, these costs varied from estimates of $5,000 to 520,000 in grand tota l 
costs for outpatient treatment, to estimates of S 17,000 to 542 ,000 per 
month for in·patient treatment. 153 In a legal context, these rehabilitative 
costs would be pan, bur not all, of the porential "compensatory damages" 
and would necessarily be projected into the future. 
8. Debr Accumularion 
While the liquid assets lost by a patho logical gambler were 
traditionally harder to track, by the twenty-first century, "players cards" 
uti lized gambling technology to track such losses; particul arly for casinos, 
and especially in electronic gambling devices (EGOs) such as video 
gambling machines (VGMs). The overall figure for these gambling losses 
inc luded debt accumulat ion once liquid assets were lost and could be 
tracked not only through credit card companies, but also through the 
gambling industry's in-ho use credit mechanisms. 
In 1990, the most authoritative government repon analyzing 
pathological gamblers calculated indebtedness at a range of 572,000 to 
$83,000/ 54 with a weighted average of $75,000. 155 In 1991. the "average 
gambling debt of ca llers to the New Jersey Compulsive Gambling Hotline 
[was] $41 ,848.,,156 "I t is of interest to note that, as a rule of thumb, when a 
compulsive gambler states the amount of debt he/she has due to gambling, 
an accurate figure is arrived at by multiplying by 3.,,157 Other experts 
believed that a multiplier of "2" was more accurate. Pathological gamblers 
had historically demonstrated characteristic problems including "extensive 
indebtedness and consequent default on debts and other financial 
responsibilities. ,,158 
"Id 
m l3GA REPORT, wpra note 104. at 15 (quOting l'olitzer et aI., S'lpra note 94, at 139). 
,B CGC Costs . . '·"prtJ not" 150 
,\.4 GAMBLING ADDICTiON IN MARYLA:-'D, supra nOle 94. at 60-61. 
;1' fd 
" Ann E.. Andrews. DllltJoost". U.S. :-.'EWS & WORLD REp .. Mar. 25. 1991. al 12. 
II' Leiter from Ehzabeth George. E:l:C\:Uli\"e Director, IIimnesolll Council on Compulsive 
Gambling, Inc .. 10 John Warren Kindt, Professor, Unive rsi ty of l11inois (December 21, 19Q2) 
., OSM-l ll, Slipr{j note 102, at 324 for analyses of the Significant stralegic and regional eo'm of 
gambling-related bankruptcies. see John W. Kindt & John K. Palchak, Legali~ed Gambling:. 
I 26 Sowhern California Interdisciplinary Loll Journal (Vol. 13: 1 In 1999, the NGISC FinaL Report confinned these earlier-reported trends and reported $754°00 to $150,000 as the mnge of indebtedness of pathological gamblers. 's 
9. "Other Socio-Economic COS1.\·' a.k.a. "Costs of Abuse" 
Other socio-economic costs or the "coslS of abuse" were being 
delimited as significant by at least 1983. By 1994, "other socio-economic 
costs" incl uded costs due to child abuse, child neglect, and spousal abuse. 
For example, after casino gambling came to Lawrence County, South 
Dakota, the Stale Atlomey's Office reported an increase of 42 percent in the 
number of child abuse cases between 199 1 and 1993. ' bO 
By definition, pathological gamblers evince "disrupted family 
relalionships.,,161 A 1982 study of members in Gam-Anon, which 
const itutes a family organization that parallels Gamblers Anonymous, 
reported that with regard 10 spouses of pathological gamblers, "[e ]rnotional, 
verbal, and physical abuse was noted in 43% of all cases.,,162 Furthermore. 
"[i]n about 10% of the cases the children were being phys ically abused by 
the gambler." I6J The consequence was that "[s] ignificant behavioral or 
adjustment problems" were experienced by 25 percent of the children. l~ 
In 1994, a dollar va lue of the socio-economic costs of spousal abuse 
had not yet been calculated. Preliminary data indicated that 15 pcrcenl of 
the wives of pathologica l gamblers were "battered" or physically abused. 16S 
In various samples, 43 percent to 50 percent of the cases involving spouses 
of pathological gamblers reported physical, verbal , or emotional abuse. l66 
10. "Commonplace Crime Costs" a.k.a. "Property Crimes and 
Miscellaneous Crimes ,. 
By 1994, the sociological literalure had ident ified "commonplace crime 
costs" thai paralleled the legaVgovemmental definitions of "property 
crimes;' wh ich are usually defined as theft crimes motivated by the need 
for money. The sociologists, however, tended to delimit ·'commonplace 
crime costs" to include not on ly larceny, burglary. and anned robbery, but 
Desrabilizalion of u.s. Financial lnsliwlions lInd lhe BankinK Inll"~lr) "'~ue., in 8ml /auplC). Credit, 
<lnd Socwt Nom' Pmdm'lwIl. I Q D.IOR~' U. L. UANKR. DE\', J. 21 (2002). 
' $0 NG1SC FINAL Rr:PORT. supra llOle 3. at 4·13 (describing the range of indebledness of 
palhological gamblef!; altendmg Gambkf!; Anonymous). 
I ... Jeffry BloomberJ. Slale'S Altomey for Lawn:IICC County. S.D .. Speech befoT\' Ihe Coahllon of 
Concerned Cilizens Agal!lSl Gambling in Jo Da_ie5S Couuly (Nov. 17, 1991); Lener from Jeffry 
Bloomberg, Slale's Allomey for Lawrence County. S.D, 10 Jolm Warren Klndl. Professor. Unl~enil) of 
IIhoOiS (Jan. 4. 1993) (contaming crime staliSlics for Lawn:occ County, S.D.) Iheremafter Leiter from 
Bloomberg 10 Kindt). Sn abo Et:OI1omiC' ImpactS. supra noIe 97. at 72·73. 
,., DSM-ll i. !Jupru note 102, at 324. Compart! Id, with DS\i·IV. supra note 102. al 615·IB 
10.1 Valene Lomu: & Duane E. SlulIIh:sworth, Tht' /ttlpilct of Pmhologtcul Gambli1lg on the Spouse 
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also pimping, prostitution, selling drugs, and fencing stolen goodS. 167 
These subcategories were identified because they correlated with the 
crimes mosl frequently committed by pathological gamblers. l68 
11. "Gambling System Crime Costs" 
By the latc 1980s, the sociologists had defined the category of 
"gambling system crime costs" to include those costs due to bookmaking, 
working illegal games, hustling at pool, cards, dice or sports, running a 
"con game," swindllng "suckers," and other criminal fraud. l69 These 
subcategories were used because they correlated with the crimes most 
frequently conunitted by pathological gamblers,I70 
C. NEGLECTING TO MAKE GOOD FAITH ESTIMATES OF THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC COSTS OF PATHOLCXJJCALAND PROBLEM GAMBLERS: 
A FAILURE OFTHE 1999 U.S. GAMBLING COMMISSION? 
With a multi-million dollar budget for research, the 1999 U.S. 
Gambling Commission was charged by Congress with the task of 
delimiting and defining at least some of the social and economic costs of a 
pathological gambler and a problem gambler. Instead of proceeding from 
the historical academic outline for analyzing these coSts and then 
advancing the research, the Commission wavered. Accordingly, it appeared 
to miss the opportunity to establish cost definitions or guidelines: 
Estimating the costs of problem and pathological gambling is an 
extraordinarily difficult exercise---and a subject of heated debate. 
Without common standards of measurement, comparisons are 
problematic at best. Dollar costs would allow the clearest 
comparisons, especially in relation to the economic benefits from 
gamblin g. Yet, how can human suffering be tallied in terms of 
money? And many of the consequences commonly attributed to 
problem gambling, such as divorce, child abuse, deprcssion, and so 
forthj may be the result of many factors that are difficult to single out.] ] 
Because of this, the hi storical definitions of the johns Hopkins Reporr, 
as supplemented by the 2001 analysis by Profcssors Grinols and Mustard, 
remained the most authoritative academic determinations until at least 
2003. 
,., Sec Uskllr. Economic Costs. ,""pra note 94, Table 2, at 21. See generally Lesieur & "uig, 
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v. TRENDS AN D CONDITIONING FACTORS 
A. T HE STRATEGIC QUESTIONS IN GANlBLI NG ISSUES 
There arc several questions which are centml to a proper analysis of 
gambling issues. The first is whether gambling per se is simply a 
recreational activity without any downside. The U.S. gambling indust!), 
maintained this posit ion until the mid-1990s. However, studies throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s revealed a downside - negative social and economic 
consequences. Since the mid-1990s even the gambling industry's lobbying 
group, the AGA, has acknowledged the existence (but disputes the degree) 
of such consequences. lJ2 
The second question is whether state and national govern ments shoul d 
encourage or "legalize" gambling activities as a source of short-tenn tax 
revenue, or whether the long-tenn socio-economic consequences outweigh 
the short-term benefits.173 Gambling ind ustry proponents look for the 
former, as they have a large financial interest in triviaJizing social or 
economi c consequences that may exist for govemments that legalize and 
spread gambling throughout thc public domain. 
The following questions arise frcqucntly in this area : 
1. What is the definition, or what are the determining traits of a 
"pathological gambler" (i.e., the dcfinitional "gold standard" for 
"pathological gamblers")? 
2. What is thc companion dcfinition/dctenninat ion of a "problem 
gambler" (i.e., the definitional "gold standard" for "problem 
gamblers")? 
3. To what extent does the increased spread of legalized gambling 
create new pathological and problem gamblers (usually expressed 
as a percentage of the general population ovcr a one or five year 
period)?174 
4. \Vhat are the IOtal soc io-economic costs of eac h new 
pathological gambler and each new problem gambler? A corollary 
question asks what the costs are in individual cost categories, such 
'" Set" Brett Pulley. Compu/$iw: Gambling Spreads. Largely Dill' 10 Legality. N.V. n\tES. Dec. 7. 
1997, at A I Ihereinafter CQmpul.~ive (JamMing Spreadl Due 10 Legaliryl. 
I7l See John W Kindt. The BlIsi",,",· .• -Eamomie I"'pad' of Licensed Casino Gambling in West 
Virginia: Shorl-Term Gain bur Long-Term Pain, 13 W. VA. U. PUB. AFF. REr. 22 ( 1996) (provid ing 
sample summaries of these issues) ; Cong.-essional Gambling Hearing 1994. supra note 44, at 77. See 
,,/so John W. Kindt. U.s. National Securily lind Ihe Simregic E~"Onomic Base: The Bu.,·im!l·,/Econm",c 
Impacr., Of Tire Legalizarion Qf Gamblinf{ Acrivities , 39 ST. Lous U. L.J. 567 (1995). For th~ 
internat ional implications of the decriminalization of organizeil gambling, see John W. Kindt & Anne E. 
C. Brynn, Destructi,'e Econamie Po/ide)' in Ihe Age ofTemmsm: Gowrnmem-Sanc/ioned Gambling A.,· 
Encouraging Transooundary EconomiC Raiding and De..wbiJi:ing Nationrll and Il1Iernlllionrli 
Economies. 16 TEMPLE lNT'L & COMPo L. J. 243 (2002). 
,,. For ~ summary. see Compll/siw Gambling Sp,n,d)' Due 10 Legaluy, )'upm note J 72, at A I. 
l1at"\"ard Division on Addictions Press Releasc. ""prrl note 1 03. 
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as /lew crime costs attributed to a pathological gambler, and how 
those cost categories are defined. 
The complexity of this last question, as well as the beginning blueprint 
for addressing these issues, was out lined in the previous section detailing 
the historical background of gambling issues in the 19805 and 1990s. 
The U.S. Gambling Commission was fonned in 1996 with a mandate 
to "assess[] pathological or problem gambling, including its impact on 
individuals, families , businesses, social institutions. and the economy,,,m 
or implicitly, to answer the above questions. University of lllinois 
economics professor Earl Grinols proposed to the Commission of the 19905 
that these types of questions be addressed and analyzed in diverse 
geobrraphic U.S. locales. However, this approach was not incorporated into 
the Commission's research agenda. 
It is important to emphasize that manipulation of the definitional 
standards by special interest groups would di stort the four essential 
questions, and any future statistical comparisons would become convoluted 
or even futi le. "Trends" involving increases in the numbers of pathological 
and prob lem gamblers due to the spread of legalized gambli ng are thus 
rendered suspect, because they can be obfuscated by vested interests that 
are sens itized to government decis ion-makers alerted to the socio-eeonomic 
costs of pathological and problem gamblers. 
Prior to the 1995 advent of the AGA, the definitional gold standards for 
the "pathological gambler" and the "problem gambler" were well 
established in the sociological literature as being delimited by the 
questionnaire tests of the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS),17i; based 
on the American Psychiatric Association's definition in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual o/Mental Disorders. 177 \Vhile sociological studies prior 
to 1995 might have modified the SOGS (or the SOGS-Revised screen) 
somewhat as new infonnation became available, comparisons could now 
be made between most studies because of the general use of the SOGS as 
the "gold standard." Comparisons were also possible usi ng some lesser-
util ized screening methods. 
Even the 1997 Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, financed by a 
$140,000 grant from the gambling industry,m acknowledged that the 
SOGS was util ized in approx imately two-thirds of the 152 studies 
analyzed. '79 However, the Meta-analysis also proposed completely new 
delimitations/definitions for the first two essential questions l80 and departed 
from the established "gold standard" delimitations/definitions for the 
n Pub. L No. 104-169, l04th Cong .. Sec. 4(a)(2}(C) (19%). 
1"0 See. eg. Henry R u,sieur & Sheila B Blume. The So,.lh Oaks Gamblmg S,'re",,, (SOGS).· A 
Ne .... Inslrumem jor Idemijicalio1l of Palhologicol Gamblers, 144 A~1. J PsYCHIATRY. Sept. 1981. at 
\184-87. 
'"' Compare DSM-IV. wpra nOle 102. at 015-1 8. § 312.31 (pathological gambling), wilh DSM-l1L 
wpra note 102, at 324-25, § 312.31 (patholog ical gambling). 
n Casil'" Backlash. ~"pm !>ote 25. al Al 
p, Harvard Addictwns Meta-analysis. :fllpra note 103, AppendiX 2. 
110 For the essential questions. <<'e <upm footnotes 173- 175 and accompanying l~xl 
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pathological gambler, problem gambler, and indirectly, the SOGS. 
Accordingly, the Meta-analysis actually proposed a new terminology: 
(a) "Level 3" as "disordered gambling" which would satisfy 
certain diagnostic criteria (i.e., a "pathological gambler"); 
(b) "Level 2" as a "pattern of gambling that is associated with 
adverse consequences, but does not meet criteria for diagnosis as a 
pathological gambler" 81 (basically, a "problem gambler"); and 
(e) "Levell " as basically an "at risk gamblcr."'Sl 
These proposed defi nitional changes convoluted any comparison 
between studies and obfuscated dctcrminalions involving the third essential 
question, i.e., -'how much does the spread of legalized fambling create 
new pathological gamblers and flew problem gamblers?"I!! The net result 
was that the issues became more convoluted, wh ich purposely or not, 
operates to the detriment of academic discourse and to the public relations 
benefit of pro-gambling interests. 
The abil ity to make comparisons between studi es was made even morc 
difficult when the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's introduced its 
new NODS screen lliQRC DSM ~creen for Gambling Problems).184 While 
a revised screen was probably necessary for the Commiss ion's work, and 
while the NODS probably should become the future standard, the new 
NODS should have provided parallel comparisons to the previous studies 
- especially to the "gold standard," the SOGS (and the SOGS-Revised). 
Although the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group did not provide 
relevant comparisons to SOGS, one of the Group 's co-authors. Rachel 
Volberg, had earlier concluded that these comparisons needed to be made. 
In one 1997 study, she devoted a whole chapter to the topic, which she 
entitled, "Comparing The SOGS And The DSM_IV.,,18s Volberg 
summarized her conclusions as follows: 
In moving forward , it is essential that the performance of any new 
instrument , such as the DSM-IV, be compared to the South Oaks 
Gambling Screen as we ll as to clinical assessments so that findings 
based on these new measurements can be matched to findings 
based on the South Oaks Gambling Screen. In this way, the field 
of gambling research can move forward in an evolutionary, rather 
than revolutionary, manner. J86 
Because federally funded research was designed to answer the difficult 
questions that had stymied the "unfunded" academic community for years, 
these omissions by the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group were doubly 
disappoLn ting to academia. In all fairness, however, this problem should 
," NOISC FNAL REPORT. supra note 3. a1 4·6 
'll See id. See generally Harvard AddlctiollS Meta·anaIY,ls. supra nOie 103. al ii·;\'. 
, I) Se .. supra notes 173·175 and accompanying te~t. 
, ... See. e.g. , Chnstmnsen Assoc.·NORC 1999 On:l"'-l .. w Sun·ey. supra note 14.3116-20 
,0$ Rachel A. Vol berg. Gambling and Problem Gambhng in Colorado. Gemllli Rescan:h (Aug. 28. 
1997) ~oo file with author) 
, ld. al 28. 
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not be attributed exclusively to the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group, 
because the AGA lobbyists completely changed the research environment 
of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission. The AGA's attempts were 
exemplified by a May 21, 1998 press conference with Frank Fabrcnkopf, 
the CEO of the AGA, during the Chicago hearings of the Commission. 
During the press conference, Fahrcnkopf tried to impeach Volberg with her 
1 ·· h '" own statements. c almmg t at: 
[Rachel Volbcrg] has publicly stated that her figures. have [sic] 
"acquired a reality that T do not believe it merits ... it is not based 
on actual data on the costs of pathological gambling in any reliable 
sense ... I wouldn't stand up in a peer-reviewedjoumal and try to 
defend this approaeh.,,'8s 
Obvious ly. these statements by Volberg were taken out of context, but 
they reveal the AGA's attempts to prejudice the research environment. In 
any event, it could be argued that the NODS was at least more current and 
definitionally superior to the proposed changes of the 1997 Harvard 
Addictions Meta-analysis. 
With regard 10 the Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis. these types of 
problems were al so highlighted by the failure of the Meta-ana lysis to 
provide the numbers (percentages) of pathological gamblers and problem 
gamblers in cach of the studies rcported l89 - a fairly s imple process thaI 
academics would expect in ordcr \0 eonfinn the report's concl usions. 
Thereafter, a subsequent commitment to provide those numbers went 
unfulfilled, despite the fact that the commitment was publicly made by 
Associate Professor Howard ShafTer. the lead author of the Meta-analysis. 
during a 2000 Conference - an event the Harvard group cosponsored - at 
the University of Il linois at Chicago Medical School. l90 
After some of the criticisms of the 1997 Harvard Addict ions Meta-
analysis were highlighted during the public hearings of the 1999 U.S . 
Gambling Commission,191 and thereaOer expressed in the Mega-LawslIits 
article in MDE, the lead author of the Meta-analysis. Associate Professor 
Howard Shaffer, contacted the MD£ editorship and he was allowed to write 
'11 Press Release. Frank J. Fahrenkopf, JT .. PreSident and CEO, American Gaming Assoclllilon. 
AI1!i·Gammg Thl1man), at thc KGISC Chicago I.leeting (May 21. 1998). available at 
http: ' Iw"' ..... ·.americanS"minG.orglpresslp=;~Jelcase!>'pre.Ldetail.ofV'!ld .. 143 (last visi ted No~. 14. 
2003) 
'''Id. 
,to See. e.g.. Ila r.am Addictions Meta-analySIS. st/pra notc 103, at Appendix 2. 
I. Speaker's Qoc~lIollllnd Answer Semon with l10ward 1. Shaffer. A'>SOCiale Professor. Director 
of DI\ ISlon on Addictions, Ilarvard Medical School. 'Understanding Gambling and Its POIcntialllealth 
Consequences.' al 1he Medical Cem~"f. lonlvcnll )' of Ilhnois. Chicago (May 4, 2000) (registration 
through Ihe National Center for Responsible Gaming, an organizalion pomari ly fi nanced by 
eomnbullons from pro-gambl in!!; imerest:5). See. e.g .. letter from Um~ers1ty of it1ioois Research 
Associate. 10 Howard J ShuOer. Assoclatc Professor. l1arvard Medic~11 School (/l.lay 10. 2000) 
(requestmg basellllc numbers); Letter from Howard J Shaffer. Asooo;iatc Professor, Harvard Mwical 
School, \0 Uni\ersity of 1II11l0is Research ASSOCiate (May 31, 2(00) (stating uocenainly and dedinin!! 
10 pro, ,de the numbcrs) . 
... Su. e,g .. Hearings before the National Gambling Impact Study CommiSSIOn, Chicago. II I., 
/.13) 20-21. 1998 
I 
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a response. However, Shaffer subsequently failed to submit anyt hing to 
"'''DE for publication. Addi tionally, Executive Director Keith Whyte of the 
Nat ional Counc il on Problem Gambling made a similar request. but 
likewise apparently did not submit anything for publication in MDE 
either. 1'n 
Given these concerns in a research environment where pro-gambling 
interests, in paniclllar, m(!i ntained an overbearing financ ial presence, the 
U.S. Gambling Commission was intended by federal legis lators to be free 
of any industry influences, I'l] The Congressional sponsors of the U.S . 
Gambling Commission were also alamed by the partia lly successful 
attempts of the gambling indus~s lobbyists 10 stack the Commission with 
pro-gambl ing Commissioners. I Accordi ngl y, the federally-funded 
research was designed to avoid andlor distinguish industry-fi nanced or 
industry-tainted analyses, '95 
The pro-gambling interests themse lves first raised crit ic isms of the 
Christiansen Associates-NORC research, All research groups should be 
able to investigate whatever areas they wish - free from the direct and 
indirect influences of pro.gambling interests or other special interests, 
When the Christiansen Assoc iates-NORC Group provided little or no 
rebuttal to the alleged inil ial interferences or intimidation tactics of the 
pro-gambling interests, the issues raised by the pro-gambling interests 
became magnified, and they must necessarily be analyzed in any future 
litigat ion requiring expcl1 testimony. Potential Iitigators should be supplied 
with both an outline of the issues and a list of the research, which may have 
been fmanced andlor otherwise impacted by pro-gambling interests, When 
pro-gambl ing interests such as the AGA publicly claim to impact panicu lar 
research or simply create the appearance of having impacted that 
research, '% then those issues must necessarily be addressed. For example., 
on March 18, \999, the AGA lobbying group issued a press release '9 
"l See, e.g" Memonu'llum from Paul H. Rubin, Professor and Editor·m·Chlef, \iaflagerial and 
Decision Economics, to "anous authors in MDE 2001 (Dec 24,2001) (on file with author), 
") ~, e g .. Editorial, CQIIg.-ess WJd GiJmbling, WASil. I'OST. Aug 12, 1<)96, at A 12. (~The eiron 
of the 19ambling mdu:.tl)"!iJ lobbyists flOW WIll be to weakefJ the investIgat ion as mu<:h as posSible by 
pushing to ~lack Ihe membcnhip" orlhe 1999 U.S, Gamblmg COITUlllssion), Edilorial, Anlndependenr 
toole/ll Gambllllg. WASil, POST, Oct. IS, 1996. 3tA26 ("Iflhe ICommls;;lon's] mcmb..:rshlp lurns OUI to 
be excusively indUS!T)'-<lnentcd, the wh.ole purpose of the legislation will have been undercut and ItS 
timJ mgs will be suspect")~ WilHam Salire, I'oli/jea/ (jambling. ;>.I.Y. TI)..tES, Nov 2 1, \996, at A19 
(CommIssIoners picked by US. legislators such as Representati,'e DIck Gcphanlt') pick of 
pro-gambling John Wilhelm ··would stack the commj.)ioll In gambling's favOf', guaran tecmg a Pablum 
rcpon,"), For coocems in\ohing rro-gambl ing lobbYists .. stackmg'· th.e CommiS'lon Il$ npressed by 
tht; chlcflegislative sponsors,lo,S Scnawr Paul Simon and U,S RcprcscmaliYc Frank \.\olf. see Press 
Release of Paul Simon, U.S ~n.alor, "SImon Says Don'I Stack Thc Deck On Ganlbling Commission,R 
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 10. 1996) (on file WIth author); Press Release of Fnmk Wolf, US. 
Rcpr~mative, "CollCems About t\alional Gambling COnunISS'On Appointments,'· Washmgton, D.C. 
(OCI. lQ, 1996) (on fiJe wilh author). 
'''ld 
'''' Id 5<.., also CED REPORT, ~ .. pro note 38, al e:u:cUI\~C summary 
lot Amcncan Gaming Association Criticizes:Spins \lORC Rcpon to I\GISC, sl'pra nOlC 65; 
American Gaming Association Clatmed I\ORC Altcrs Flnd!ll¥s,£upra OOI:e 6S. I.- 111 
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slighting NORC's research and claiming there were " two scientifically 
dishonest adjustments.,, 198 This AGA press release was concom it ant with 
an assoc iated document titled "NORC Alters Findings of Final Repon with 
Sensat ional Language, Data Mod ificat ions and Omissions. and Unsound 
Analysis."I99 These types of AGA tactics speak for themselves and should 
be ignored, but they nevenhe less highlight the environmem in which 
researchers on gambling issues must operatc.2OO 
As a practical exercise, academic sources such as the NORC may need 
to collect infonnation from sources within the gambling industry. These 
groups, however, should be cautious about co-authorship with those 
sources directl y or indirectly linked financially to pro-gambling interests. 
When the NORC prominently associates or co-authors wi th groups such as 
Christiansen Associates. which are perhaps financially benefiting from 
contacts with the gambling industry, the existence andlor degree of any 
financial linkages will often become the object of questioning in any 
academic debate-and panicularly in any judicial proceeding. To avoid 
these concerns completely, academic groups must necessarily divorce 
themselves from any appearance of conniets of in teres I. 
Perhaps due in pan to the different diagnostic methods utilized, the 
Christiansen Associates-NO RC Group's report generally contained the 
lowest level s of patho logical and problem gamblers of the recent reports 
summarized by the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission201 (see Table 4_2).202 
As the U.S. Gambling Commission conceded: 
It is possible that the numbers from the NRC [National Research 
Council] and NORC studies may understate the extent of the 
problem. Player concealment or misrepresentat ion of information 
and the rel iance of surveyors on telephone contact alone may cause 
imponant information on problem or pathological gamblers to be 
missed. For example, among pathological gamblers. a common 
characteristic - in fact, one of the DSM-1V criteria - is 
conceal ing the extent of their gambling. Data in the NORC survey 
suppon the theory that even non-problem gamblers tend to 
understate their negative experiences related to gambling. And, in 
fact, su rvey respondents greatly exaggerated their wins and 
underreported their losses.20~ 
The 1999 Commission reported the research results within the context 
of the definitional ';gold slandard" debate for: (I) pathological gambler. 
(2) problem gambler, and (3) the South Oaks Gambling Screen's interface 
with the DSM. A future corollary definitional debate may involve report ing 




>0 "G1SC fl'lAl RfI'ORT. supra nOle 3. at 4-4. 4·5. & 4-6 (Table 4-2). "Companson of l'roblcm 
and Pathological Gambling Ratcs, Gcneral Adult Poputation')' 
lW Id. at Table 4.2 
l'IU NGISC FINAL REPORT. supra note 3. at 4-9. 
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of "lifetime" vis-a.-vis "past year.,,204 In reporting to the 1999 Commiss ion , 
the NORC's numbers can be compared with parallel research by the 
National Research Council (NRC) .205 
Comparison of Problem and Pathological 
Gambling I'rcvalcnce Rates 
(General Adult Population, Percentages and 
Population Numbers Affected) 
NRC (1999) NORC RDD Pa/rom NORC ROD Category Combined (1999) (1999) 
(PcrcenluJZ.e) (Percental!,e) (Percenlll llc) 
Lifetime 1.5% (3 1.2% (2.5 million) 0.8% (\.6 million) 
Pathological million 
Gamblers poop") 
Lifetime 3.9% (7.8 1.5% (3 million) 1.3% (2.6 million) 
Problem million + 7.7% At Risk (15.4 million) + 7.9% At Risk (15.8 
Gamblers people) 9.2% million) 
9.2% 
Past Year 0.9% (1.8 0.6% (1.2 million) 0.1 % (200,000) 
Pathological million) 
Gamblers 
Past Year 2.0% (4 0.7% ( 1.4 million) 0.4% (800,000) 
Problem million) + 2.9% At Risk (5.8 million) + lJ% At Risk (4 .6 
Gamblers 3.6% million) 
3-7% At Risk 2.7% 
(6-14 million) 
The nat ional press sununarized NORC's numbers as follows: 
I. pathological gamblers, 1 million; 
2. problem gamblers, 4 million; and 
3. at risk gamblers, 15 million.21M 
By comparison, in one category the National Research Council 
reponed estimates almost 9 times those of the NORC, and the NRC 
concluded that "1.8 million Americans suITer severe 'pathological' 
gambling each year.,,207 While a large anomaly existed in that in stance, 
another NORC survey indicated that there were 1.2 million "past year" 
patholo~ical gamblers, which was closer to the NRC's figure of 1.8 
million. os 
l<>I !d. at 4-4, 4-5, & 4-6. 
10> !d. 
»> See. e.g., Rick Aim, Changes Souf;ht in Casino .'iJatUles, KAI>" . CITY STAR, Feb. 10, 1999; 
Laurence Arnold. Assoc Press, Neither Side I~;UI~' /" Bel ,urich 'UI Re-,""Its "r Ga",/,/mg Swdy. ST. 
J.-REO. (Springfield. Jll.), Mar. 19, 1999, at 8. 
l<J"" Associated Press, supra note 206, at 8. See a/so NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3. at 4-4, 
4-5. & 4-6 
"" For comparisons, ~e NGiSC FINAL REPORT. supra note 3, a14-5 & 4-6. 
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D. SAMPLES OF l \'ITIAL PUBLIC CR1TICIS.MS OF TIlE ClIR ISTIAt\SEN" 
ASSOC IATES-NORC GROUP'S PREVALENCE ESTIMATES OF THE 
NUMBERS OF PATHOLOGICALA.l'>l"D PROI3LFM GAMBLEH.S INTIIE 
GENLRALADULT POPULATIO" 
The analysis and criticism of the NORC's work for the 1999 
Commission was somewhat initiated by the same editorial interests that 
prompted the 1997 Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis. which was financed 
by a grant linked to the gambl ing indusLry.209 
Overall. NORC est imated that 0.1% or 0.6% of the general adult 
population were pathological gamblers during the past 12 months, 
depending on whether pat rons arc incl uded in the analysis. Both of 
these estimates arc below those reported by studies conducted by 
Harvard Medi ca l School ( 1997) and the National Research Council 
(1999). In addition, these prevalence estimates arc considerably 
lower than estimates or past-year a lcohol dependence/abuse (9.7%) 
and past-year drug dependence/abuse (3.6%).210 
This Harvard source a lso criticized changing the gold ~ tandards and 
concluded that with regard 10 NORC's research, the "complexity or this 
issue highlights the need ror a standard nomenclature.,,211 Paradox ica ll y. 
and perhaps hypoc ritically. it could be noted that it was the 1997 Harvard 
Addictions Meta-analys is which first ob ruscated the obvious defi nitional 
gold standards ror pathological and problem gambling brt proposing 
changing to new terminology. such as "disordered gambling.,,2 -
Other concerns raised by the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group (in 
the 2003 MD£ vo lume) over criticisms involving met hodology and/or 
definitions were probably not raised init ially in the Mega-Luwsuil.\· artic le. 
but were ra ised by the arorementioned Harvard source." 
NORC used DSM-IV criteria to guide the development of a new 
survey instrument. Respondents who had lost morc than $100 in a 
single day and reported onc or more DSM-IV criteria were 
classified as pathological. problem, or at-risk. While the fanner 
two categories are common in the gambling research litcmturc, the 
ar.risk classification is not. AHisk subjects were those who 
rcponcd one or two cri tena. The notion of "at-risk" is complex, 
and poses numerous problems[.]214 
While the Christiansen Associates·NORC Group can asscrt its total 
academic independence. it may still be confronted with public news reports 
that raise questions. An analysis of informational sources indicates Ihat on 
October 9, 1998, National Commissioner and casino executive J. Terrence 
:-.. w Ctuj'lQ 8ockltuh. fupra nOI( 2S. al At. 
,,, "$ludy Comml~ion.M :;"pra nOle 67 
111 /d. 
:11X't' gem:rolly Harvard Addi(lions Meta·analysis. supra nOlc 103 
;11 "Sludy Commission."' s"pra note 67 
11' Id. 
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Lanni "threatened legal act ion against NORC,,21S when NORC presented 
some of its initial report to the U.S. Gambling Commission. The 
Christiansen Associates~NORC Group's subsequent report was dated 
February \ , 1999,21{, and the Group 's slide show to the National 
Commission was dated February 16, 1999.217 
In the interim, on February 9, 1999, the Las Vegas Review~Jotlrn[Jf18 
reported its summary of the Christiansen Assoeiates~NORC Group's 
findings with a self~exp lanatory headline 31ticie, "Casinos delighted by 
study findings:,,219 
The numbers generated by a S 1.25 mill ion survey conducted by the 
Nat ional Opinion Research Center of Chicago conclude the 
number of seriously addicted gamblers is less than half of other 
studies, including one conducted by Howard ShafTer of Harvard 
Medical School, gaming executives sa id.no 
The pro~gambling interests were obviollsly pleased with the reported 
results on the numbers of pathologica l and problem gambl ers,221 but critics 
indicated thaI the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's results did not 
"fit other srudies."n2 
Gaming industry executives who have moni tored the commiss ion 
expressed dclight al the survey findings on problem gamblers. 
"We are very pleased with the result, provided that its (survey) 
method is accepted by the scientific community." said Frank 
Fahrenkopf, chief of the American Gaming Association. 
But Commissioner Ja mes Dobson, a gaming industry critic, was 
openly skeptical. "[ am really concerned about the dat.'l we got 
back," Dobson said. "It doesn't fit other studies." 
Bernie Hom, communications director of the National Coalition 
Against Legali,zed Gambling said he thought the figures were 
"low-balled. ,,22~ 
These alleged "low-balled" numbers arc reflected in Table 4~2 of the 
m U.s. Gamblers' Habl/s /11 Cusi1lvs. 5UprU OOIe 56. See Gu""bling SUrI'f!)" supra not~ 22. 
m Chri~lial1sen Assoc .• NORC 1999 Ovcrvicw Survey, ;n'prtI note 14 
m ChnSl1anscn Assoc.-NORC 1999 Slides Survey Dalabasc, supra nOle 14. 
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Nat ional Commission's Final Report,224 and were reported in an 
li lrnosphcrc of criticism. One article stated that: 
A major study [by NORC]. . shows about 2 mill ion Americans, 
less than I percent of the population, suffer from the most serious 
gambling addictions that require psychiatric treatment. 
The statistic was welcomed by the gaming industry because it 
concludes the problem is less severe than previous research has 
suggested. 
On the other hand, gaming crit ics said they found the numbers hard 
to believe. 
J3esides pathological gamblers reqUIring medical care, another 
2 million people are considered problem gamblers, according to the 
sludy.225 
[n th is context members of the Christiansen Associates·NORC Group 
defended their work, as reported in the same article?26 
Rache l Volbcrg of the Chicago research center defended the report 
which included telephone interviews of more than 2.400 adults and 
500 young people ages 16 and 17. The study was conducted over 
nine months in 1998. 
Among other things, th e su rvey showed gambling has increased by 
20 percent among women compared to 10 percent among men 
since 1975, when a federal co mmission last studied gambling. 
The survey also showed g~ rnbling has increased among young 
adults, but only slightly.227 
C. SAMPLES OF INITIAL PUBLIC CRITICISMSOFTHE ClIRISTIANSEN 
ASSOCIATES·NORC GROUP'S COST ESTIMATES FOR 
PATIIOLOGI CAL AND PROBLEM GAMBLERS 
With regard to the social costs of pathological and problem gamblers, 
the estimates of the Christiansen Associates·NORC Group genemted 
criti cism from not only the Nationa l Commissioners, but also the gambling 
industry 's lobbyists. Initiall y, somc of the most vociferous complaints 
came from the lobbyists for the gambling industry based in Wasington, 
D.C. One such co mpl ain t was by "Frank Fahrcnkopf, Jr. , president of the 
American Gaming Association, [who] alleged that an earlier draft of the 
U< I\'G ISC FI NAL REPORT. J'''pr" nOl(.' 3, nl 4-6 (fabk 4·2). 
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report was retooled to exaggerate the dangers of gambling through 
sensat ional language and changes in conclusions."m 
In defense, the Cha ir of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Com mission, Kay 
Ja mes, su mmarized the good-faith efforts of the Commission: "Everybody 
on the commission has rea ll y struggled with this: How do you estimate the 
social cosI1"229 
Despite what may have been a good-faith elTort, the Christiansen 
Associates-NORC G roup's "part ial" estimates thai an individual 
pathological (or addicted) gambler costs society only $ 1,200 per year with 
$5 bi ll ion per t.;ear as the lolal (partial) cost were critic ized as being simpl y 
unreasonable. 0 While suc h est imates might comply with the standard 
methodology detennined by the investigators in their specialized discipline, 
these numbers appear to defy co mmon sense. Socioloiiists often compare 
pathological (or addicted) gambling to drug addiction.2 It was postulated 
that no reasonable academician would claim thai the societal costs of a 
drug addict were only $1,200 per year - particularly when the American 
Medical Associat ion estimated the total socio-medical cost of U.S. 
pat hological gamblers at 540 billion in 1994.232 According to an article by 
the Associated Press, 
[Members of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission] were troubled 
by the repon's fi nding that the economic cost of problem gambling 
is "relat ively small"- about $5 billion a year in legal fees for 
divorce, court and ja il costs for arrests, lost wages and bankruptcy. 
That compares with $72 billion for smoking, $166 billion for 
alcohol abuse and $71 billion for motor vchi cle crashes, the report 
said,m 
Notably. the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group made cost 
comparisons to alcohol abuse and heart disease,2,4 but basically 
appeared to ignore cost comparisons to drug abuse, whieh was reponed 
to the National Commission as the m.ost common sociological 
comparison made to gambling addiction.23~ These types of concerns 
and criticisms were publicly summarized by one of the National 
Commissioners: "James Dobson, president of Focus on the Fami ly and 
the panel 's most outspoken opponent of gambling, said thc $5 billion 
estimate of gambling's cost is rar too low. He wondered how to 
c<llculate the costs of child abuse or spousal abuse commined by a 
2l< Laurence Arnold. As!tOC. Press. Ndlh('~ Side Hums /0 Rc/ MI,d, "', Results ofGambllllg S1ud),. 
ST J·Rffi (Springfield. 111.), Mar. 19. 1999,318 [heremafter Arnold/. 
m id. 
'GISC FINAL RLI'OI!:r. supr(j note 3. 31 4-14. S« u/)'O Rick ,\Im. Cha"go Sought ,,, Ca""" 
SlOW/I!!. KAN CITY STAR. Feb 10.1999 
n·See. e.g .. U.s. and Imcmalional Ctt5Is. supra nole 103 
llJ American Medical Associallon. Iiouse of Delegates, Resolullon 430 (A-94) (1994) 
n' See Arnold. ~lIpf(/ IlOlc 228, 31 8 
l1< t-GISC FJ~AL R13f'ORT. SlIpr(J nOle 3. ai 4-14. 
m See. (".g, Ilearing~ ncforc the Nalional Gamhhng lmpa't Siudy Comm,.sion. Ch,cago. illinOIS. 
MIIY 20·21. 1998: U.S nnJ 1 "lemutiol~,1 Costs. S"IJra "ote 103. 
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gambling addict.,,2J6 By comparison, the National Research Council 
found significantly' more costs associated with pathological and 
problem gambling. lJ7 "The second study by the National Research 
Council - part of the Nalional Academy of Sciences, an independent 
organization chartered by Congress to advise the government- says 
pathological gamblers arc far morc likely to commit crimes, run up 
large debts, damage relationships and kill thcmse]ves."m 
39 
Disagreeing with the NRC's observations, in 1999 Jay S. Albanese 
authored a study suggesting that there was "linle evidence that the spread 
of casinos contributes significantly to white-collar crimes like 
embezzlement, forgery and fraud.,,239 Albanese's study, however, "was 
paid for by the American Gaming Association which represents [and 
lobbies for] commercial casinos.,,241) Yet even if the gambling lobby group 
had not provided the financing for this study, it would still have generated 
some academic debate because its conclusions ran counter to two decades 
of previous studics/41 as well as the results suggestcd by the 1999 official 
U.S. Gambling Commission.242 However, the fact that the Albanese study 
was financed by the gambling indust~ made it especially vulnerable to 
criticism from the academic community. 43 
VI. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With gambling issues, as with some other controversial research areas, 
there afe some alternatives for researchers. 
First, researchers can avoid even the appearance of impropriety by 
rejecting all direct and indirect financial connections to special interests. 
Of course, this policy would be the ideal, and in the area of gambling 
issues, some researchers maintain this policy. However, it is generally 
difficult for researchers to maintain thi s policy because they must forego 
many funding opportunities (particularly from the pro-gambling interests). 
The second option is for researchers to accept research funds and 
consultant fees from all sources, but ultimately exercise their independence 
from the agendas of those funding them. The problem with this approach is 
that the very existence of questionable funding sources can still raise 
credibility issues regarding whether the researcher has exercised academic 
"independence." 
'~Arnold, Silpro nOle 228, al 8. 
m See NG 1SC FIN.>\L REPOItT. supra nOle 3. al 4-13. 4-14 
1lll Arnold. 51lpro note 228, al 8. 
m See Associated Press. Gambling Tndustry Releu.,es SwJy, ...... S VFG.>\S SUN. Apr 30. 1999 
[heremafter Gamblmg ''''''l$Ir), 1999 Stlldy]. 
I .. td. 
W &-e. e.g. sources for lables in: MI.'gu-w .. ·.'uits. supra nOle 15. Tables A6-A9 and 
aecompan~ing foolI1otc SOIlrt:CS. 
,., See. e_g., NGISC FI 'I.>\L REPOkT. supra note 3. al 7-13 
10) Ga",bI"'8 Industry 1999 SlUdy. supra nOle 239 
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Another option is fo r researchers to focus on research di rectly for or 
associated with the gambling industry. Yet, doing research on behalf of 
pro·gambling interests is the most problematic of all the options because, 
as a leader of the National Council on Problem Gambling, Joanna Franklin, 
once summarized, "[t]hey're not going to fund anything that's going to hurt 
them, or [that] has the potential to hurt them.',244 
The following conclusion was expressed by onc of the leading 
researchers in gambling issues, Dr. Henry Lesieur of the Institute for 
Problem Gambling; 
There isn't one piece of research the industry has funded on the 
social costs of problem gambling that is academically respectable, 
It's all self-serving ... Jt says a 101 aboul the nature oflhe field that 
research funded by the industry is going to dominate the dialogue 
for the next few years. That is a sad state?45 
The remaining alternative was to fund research via state governments 
and the federal government. However. even stale crime statistics have been 
redirected by law by pro-gamblmg intcrests. The unfavorable crime 
statistics, which have historically plagued Atlantic City, New Jersey, and 
the concomitant negative public perceptions, motivated a new 1998 law 
that "would force the state to take fluctuations III a resort's [primarily 
Atlant ic Cii,Y's] population into account when calculating [crime 
statistics].,,24 While such fluctuations may need to be considered from an 
academic perspective, questions arose involving the propriety of state laws 
mandating research and statistical methodology for crime statistics.247 
One goal of the federal legislation creating the 1999 U.S . Gambling 
Conunission was to fund research in the area of gambling issues. Yet 
again, questions werc raised concerning the considerable and direct 
influence of pro-gambling interests on state governments, as well as on the 
1999 U.S. Gambling Commission 248 Given what appear to be over-
reaching efforts by pro-gambl!llg !Ilterests to Impact the academic/rescarch 
community ~including a strategy of "stacking·' the 1999 National 
Commiss ion) 49 researchers are constrained to only two realistic 
alternatives: either to "follow the money,,250 of the gambling industry or to 
accept no funds linked to special interests. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Studies that propose a change in the definitions of "pathological 
gambler" and "problem gambler" must academically justify the rationale 
, ... Casin() Back/a.'h, sup~a nOl~ 25. 3l A I 
'" /d. 
"6 Michele Darnell, Statehouse Bur., Cm'le Srati.,/ic5 Mus/ No .. Reflec/ Summer Populo/ion. S. 
J£RS[Y pun. Co .. Ju ly II. 1998. 
,,, Id. 
,., Cali,.,) Back/ash, supm note 25, at A I 
,.. Id. For .cl'cral >ources. sec s"p~a note 193 and accompanying 1ex!. 
:Jo See, e.g., John W. Kindt, Follow /lle Money: Gamblil1g, Elhic'. and SUbPrJi'I1US, 556 Al'''ALS 
AM. ACADE.\lY POL. & SOC SCI. 85 (1998) 
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for such changes and show the transition between the old and the new 
standard. 
Similarly. when for almost two decades the overwhelming majority of 
academics/experts have utilized the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) 
as the "gold standard" for delimiting whether a person can be categorized 
as a pathological or problem gambler,251 any study proposing modifications 
to that standard must j ust ify those modifications. Although several 
academics/experts might argue othen.vise, the Christiansen Associates-
NORC Group probably provided that justification by closely associating 
the questions for categorizing potential pathological and problem 
gamhJcrslSl with the fourth edit ion of the Diagnostic and Sralislical Manual 
oj Mental Disorders.253 However, the Chri stiansen Associates-NORC 
Group could have easily added/modified their questionnaire to allow for 
comparisons by calculating the infonnation under the SOGS gold standard. 
as well as under their newer proposed standard, as one of the Group's own 
authors recommended back in 1997. With a base research budget of 
$1.25 million, there was no financial reason as to why these basic standards 
could not be mel. 
Within these constraints, there are sound arguments fo r recognizing the 
modified DSM standard, but implications that their proposed modified 
standard has already supplanted the SOGS as the gold standard are 
unconvi ncing at best because the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group 
can only cite mostly to unpublished papers to support this assertion. 
If the national news media has raised substantial issues involving the 
gambling industry 's attempts to influence research via the industry's 
financial aura and other methods, then a jorliori the academic commun ity 
should be concerned. The academic community should distance itse lf from 
even the appearance of potential conflicts of interest with pro-gambling 
interests or other such interests. 
First Amendment academic debate necessitates that academics be abl e 
to discuss and analyze methodologies and data without the heightened 
concerns created by the gambling industry's direct or indirect interference 
or monetary influence. As indicated by the Chronicle oj Higher Education , 
the gambling industry's constant interferences with academic processes and 
debate should be rcjccted.1S4 
It is appropriate that the Chrisliansen Associates-NORC Group finally 
made thcir clari fications in a 2003 MDE issuc. Wilh a SI.25 mill ion 
budget, pcrhaps thesc basic clarifications should have been made in the 
>II See Ilafvard AddIctIons Meta-analySIS. Slipra notc 103. AppendIx 2 (showmg Ihat the South 
Oaks Gambhng Screen was used in appro~imatcly tW()-Ihirds of all Sludies during the 1980s and 
19905) , 
III See Christ ianscn Assoc ,-NORC 1999 O,"c1"\'icw Survey. supra note 14. ill Qllc~ti ons AppendIx, 
III Compare Id at 15-30 ("The Ecl ipse of the SOUlh Oaks Gambling Screen" ). wilh DSM-IV. 
supra OOIC 102 
n. Research Financed by Industry. supro nou: 24. 31 A 17. 
.. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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original report. With more widespread input from the academic spectrum, 
these problem areas shou ld have received morc cons ideration in the past. 
While several National Commissioners indicated concerns over the 
report by the Christiansen Associates-NORC Group, it was the gambling 
industry's crit icism that raised the specter of intimidated academics. The 
concern with the alleged intimidation tactics outlined in the Mega-Lawsuits 
art icle should be interpreted as support ing all research, incl uding that orthe 
Christiansen Associates-NO RC Group. While denying that the alleged 
intimidation had any impact, Volberg of that Group has recognized that 
"some [National] Commission members and others who were interested in 
the results made efforts, on the record and off, to influence NORC's work. 
One could reasonably label some of these efforts as attempts to 
intimidate.,,255 However, when confronted with intimidation tactics by 
special interest groups, academic independence should be emphasized and 
asserted when that intimidation first appears, instead of months or years 
after "sleep in g on those rights." 
With regard to frami ng the methodology, there does not appear to be 
sufficient input, if any, from the initia l researchers addressing the socio-
economic costs of pathological and problem gambling. In addition, there is 
insufficient, if any, focus on the issues raised by Pol itze r, Morrow, and 
Leavey both in their 1981 paper256 and their subsequently published Johns 
Hopkins Report.257 This concern applies equally to the in suffic ient 
references to a class ic 1990 work, Gambling Addiction in Maryland,258 by 
Drs. Robert Politzer, Valerie Lorenz, and Robert Yaffee, and to the 
tangential cost issues raised by Professor Robert Goodman in the 1994 u.s. 
Gambling Stud/59 by the University of Massachusetts. Similar omissions 
have involved a lack of attention to the ground-breaking and still relevant 
report on costs entitled Casinos In Florida: An Analysis of the Economic 
and Social Impacts , produced by a team of economists, that included 
Dr. Subhasis Das in the Florida Govemor's Office of Planning and 
BUdgeting.260 
The Congressional Hearings in 1994261 and 199521>2 certainly provided 
a framework of experts for beginn ing the costs analyses . However, the 
degree to which these leading-edge authorities were consulted when 
framing the analysis appears to be minimal to non-existent. Laudably, the 
Christiansen Associates-NORC Group's report acknowledges some of its 
m Letter from Rachel Volbcrg. Gemini Research. to Earl Gnnols. Professor of Economics, 
Uni\'er~i t y of Illinois (Oct . 17. 2001)(copies to Paul Rubin , David Mustard. John Kindt, Dean Gerstein, 
and E~cne Chrisliansen). 
Polit7..cr et aI., <upra note Q4 . 
1jJ Sa Joilns Hopkins Report. "up~<J nOle 94 
lJ! See GAM!JLJ~G ADDICTION IN MARYLANtJ, supra nOle 94. 
m Sec CED REPORT, .IUI''"'' nOle 38. 
"'" s.-c FLORIDA OFFICE OF TIlE GoVERNOR, CASINOS IN FLORIDA: AN ANALYSIS OF TIlE 
Eco~OMIC At-D SOCIAL iMP,\CTS (1994). 
1f,' CongresslOnu/ Gambling Hearing 1994. supm note 44. 
"" National Gambling Impaci & Policy Commission A"I: Hco~ing on HR. 4'17 Bt'/or<! Iile House 
Comm On I"e Judiciory, 1 O4lh Cong., 151 Ses5. (1 (95). 
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shortcomings. Nonetheless, an analysis of the testi mony before the 1999 
U.S. Gambling Commission indicates that the Commission and the NORC 
itself should have more closely reviewed the direct and indirect influences, 
which could have been exerted by the gambling industry in framing the 
analys is.263 As indicated in the 1994 Columbia Journalism Review/64 
academics new to the issues need to be alert to being misdireclcd/65 as the 
gamhlinr;: industry has been increasing its adroitness at obscuring the 
ob\, j ous , ~(,6 
Attacks upon the credibility of academic sources by the chief lobbyist 
for the gambling industry, Frank Fabrenkopf, have been almost totally 
ignored by the press267 and have, in fact, opcmted to confirm the crcdibility 
of those attacked by pro-gambling interests, including the NORC.268 For 
example, the former executive director of the U.S . Gambling Commission, 
Tim Kell~4 has repeatedly rebuffed Frank Fahrcnkoprs attacks on academic 
sourccs. 2 In addition, one of Fahrenkopf's targeted academic 
organizations, for example, is now listed on the first page of the "Sources 
of Infonnation and Resources on Gambling" recommended by the Final 
Report of the 1999 U.S . Gambling Commission,no 
It may be argued that the pattem of inappropriate behavior by 
pro-ga mbling interests has prejudiced the research environment in volving 
gamb li ng issues and created disharmony and disagreements thai should not 
exist. Furthermore, the critical analysis of the infonnation disseminated by 
l6) See '''pm nOle 193 (aecompan>illg text Includes sc~eral SOl11"(:es on the gambhng industry's 
allcm~IS to skew Ih" 1999 U.s. Gambling Commission's tindmgs) 
.... COlUl>1. JOURN,\LlSM REv.. ~r,pru nOle 5. at 36, 37·38. 
l'J/d. 
]o.Jd. 
l.1 ror e,amples of the American Gammg Association lobbymg group's attack.> on the credibility 
and re"earch of the J\ational Opmion Research Center at the University of Chicago, see 'upm note); 
65·1'>6, 196·200 and accompanying text See. "g.. '\ Inerican Galiling Association Criticizes/Spins 
NORC Repon to r-.. G ISC. ,upro notc 65; American Gammg Association Claimed NORC Alters 
Findmgs. supra note 65. See al.w American Gaming Association, Pres, Rebl'~, Sl;Ilement by CEO 
Frank Fahrenkollf. Jr., AGA. during the Heanngs of thc National Gambling Impact Study Commission. 
Chicago. IlIlIlois (May 21. 19')8). Although attended by many members of the national press who "ere 
covering the hearings of the National GmnbliLlg Jmp',el Study Commission. Frank Fahrenkopf's 
May 21, 1'<98 pr~ss conferencc (ll1~ckmg the academiC community (as IIlvoJ~cd In a conspiracy theory 
to discredit the gambling industry) was ignored by virtually all of the ne"s media except Ihe 
Nevada/Las Vega~ press 
w,fJ 
2ffl For attacks on the credibility of several academics by gambling indu,lry lobbyist Frnnk 
rahrenkopf. see id. See at"" Panel 0;;;CI1%101'. "lkltlng 011 the FUII.Jr<;: Takmg Gaming and the Law 
imo the 21s1 Century."' lienjamin N. Cardozo La\\ School, Yesh;~a University. Nc\\ York. NY, 
No~. 15·](;, 1999 ("'Current Is sues in Casino Resort Gmning"). For example. a chalk!ll!~ by an c,.hlor 
of the Gaming LI)l> ",-"/,'1<' combined 'I ith 1'10 ~hall~ng~s by gamblirlg lobbyist Frank Fahrcnkopf that 
the J\ atlonaJ Gambling Impact Study Comm;>sion found Professor John Kindt's r,,<;oeJrch no,"cred iblc" 
were twice rebuffed by Tim Kdly. th" fonner c,~ecull\e director of the National Gambling Imp<!ct Study 
Commission. who l!ldirat~d that the CommlS5lOn specifically tbund Kindt's research "credible" and 
cHed to Kindt in sOl"ccal places in the Filial Rc,,()~1 of Ihe Commi,sion . Id See, eg .. "IGISC FJ:;'AL 
RfPORT, .""pm not" 3, at Ill-I I. \/·3. Y.IO, v· n. Y·19, YI-1. 
'''' NGISC Fl\ .o.L 1U1'Olu . . wpra note 3, Appendix VI. at I ("Sources of Infonnation and 
Resources on Gamhling") 
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pro·gambling interests has almost become a science. At the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, the research controversies that manifested 
themselves were largely centered on the potential research infl uence and/or 
interference of pro-gambl ing interests. These issues highlight the researc h 
problems that are likely to be raised in any discovery process of 
infonnation pursuant to the litigation process. 
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APPENDIX: TABLE 3 
Percentage 01 E_pendltures by Problem Gamblorslor s..leclGd Forms 01 Gambling by StatIlJPro"inca.· 
Alberta Billish Columtlia Nova Scol ... WashinlltOll Loob!llma ,~, New York Avera!l!!; 
Bingo <%) 43.6 37.3 
'" 
44.6 N" N" 39.5 J9 
Lotto (%) 11.31oIto; 11.910Ito: 6.2 101to: 22.7 24.2 dmly gmoo 176 ai l iono 24.4 inSlant 21.9 lotto; 36 14 lotto: 20.6 
19.3111$tam 14.3 scrntch ~." gam611 quick draw InSlanl4cratct1 
Casino (%) 37.2Io(:a l, 26.7 resofl; 46.7 55.0 card/dice N" )8.4 table 41.4 418 table games 
34 4 cardldice 33.1 tatlle 
Slots (%) 
" 
WA 89 WA NIA 16.1 NIA 
'" Video Machine (%) 46.9 WA 50' 23.9 
'" 
WA 74.6 46.8 
All Games (%) 32.3 226 ,.. ,,, 
'" 
>G' 39.1 
'" Horus("I4) S4.2onand 29.5 on-track WA 25.9 52 7 QIlotracic 48.4 50 
011 !Jack 84 9 oll. track 
Sports <%) 19.0 fnend$/' 217 sporlS; 19.7 WA 189 pools. 82 7 
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43.9 50 
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1996). The AuSlre)ian PrO<lucl1Vi1y Comrnrssion P999) e!Wmal.!d that problem gamblers account for 5.7% of money Spenl on lottery play. 107% 01 
casino table game pIey, 19% 01 scratch locket sales. 33% 01 WDg6mIQ on tmrs.es and dogs, and 42% of money spent on gam.ng mach,ne play. 
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Health. HalifaK, Nova Scotia: 
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